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I. INTRODUCTION
Students must have the opportunity to connect, associate, and
communicate freely and without interference on the Internet except in cases
of clear threat of harm or imminent danger.1 Supreme Court precedent does
not suggest that First Amendment protections should apply with less force
when public students utilize technology in their private time.2 The protection
1

Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (stating that the First Amendment
permits a State to ban “true threats,” which are statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an unlawful and violent act, regardless
of actual intent to carry out the threat, to protect individuals from the fear of violence and
disruption); LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU DID: SOCIAL
NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY 89 (2012) (arguing employees and students deserve
free speech rights and there is a necessity to create a Constitution for the web protecting
internet expression).
2
See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972). A state-supported college
denied Petitioner’s application requesting official campus recognition of a local Students for
Democratic Society chapter. Id. at 179. The Supreme Court further noted, “[t]he college
classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break
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of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of
American schools.3 Courts have struggled to draw a line that protects both
the pedagogical concerns of educational curriculums and the often
controversial, yet essential, student voice under the First Amendment since
the early 1900s.4
In the meantime, social networking platforms have revolutionized
the way people communicate. 5 There are currently more than one billion
www.Facebook.com (“Facebook”) users worldwide. 6 More than sixty-five
percent of American adults and nearly ninety-five percent of younger age
groups use social networking websites. 7 Society encourages children to
acquire computer skills at a young age, understanding the importance of
these skills in what has become a technological world.8 Users make their
thoughts instantly accessible to millions by posting comments, videos, or
pictures from nearly any location, presenting new and important First
Amendment issues for courts across the country.9 Without guidance from the
United States Supreme Court, lower courts have struggled to determine if

no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic
freedom.” Id. at 180–81. See also Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589,
603 (1967).
3
Healy, 408 U.S. at 180; Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (stating “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere
more vital than in the community of American schools . . . ‘[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to
inquire, to study and to evaluate . . . .’”); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957).
4
Healy, 408 U.S. at 197 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[Student] interests and
concerns are often quite different from those of the faculty. They often have values, views,
and ideologies that are at war with the ones which the college has traditionally espoused or
indoctrinated. When they ask for change, they, the students, speak in the tradition of Jefferson
and Madison and the First Amendment”).
5
John Browning, Universities Monitoring Social Media Accounts of StudentAthletes: A Recipe for Disaster, 75 TEX. B. J. 840, 842 (2012) (discussing the discipline of
student athletes for information shared on social networking websites).
6
Id.
7
Id. On February 4, 2004, “The Facebook” launched and became available to
students at Harvard University. DAVID KIRKPATRICK, THE FACEBOOK EFFECT: THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE COMPANY THAT IS CONNECTING THE WORLD 30 (2010). By the following fall
semester, eighty-five percent of American college students were users of the site, which had
dropped the “The” to become known as simply “Facebook.” Id. at 149. Facebook later became
available to non-college students and its growth continued world-wide. Id. at 150.
8
ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 77 (arguing that we do not let children drive until
they are sixteen or drink until they are twenty-one and allowing a child to access a social
networking website can be the equivalent of handing them the car keys in terms of the damage
they can do to both themselves, as well as others).
9
Eric D. Bentley, He Tweeted What? A First Amendment Analysis of the Use of
Social Media by College Athletes and Recommended Best Practices for Athletic Departments,
38 J.C. & U.L. 451, 452–53 (2012) (addressing the legality of limiting or restricting the use of
social media by college athletes).
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and when educational institutions can punish students for speech that occurs
online.10
The First Amendment signifies a profound commitment to the
fundamental principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited.11
This principle exists because “speech concerning public affairs is more than
self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.”12 As society advances,
issues continue to arise which present questions unforeseen by the Framers
of the Constitution.13 In such cases, the Constitution is treated as a living
document, adaptable to new situations, and time-honored principles must be
applied consistently.14 Accordingly, constitutional protections must not yield
to the developing technological world.15
In 2009, the University of Minnesota punished Amanda Tatro, a
junior in the Mortuary Science Program, for a number of disturbing status
updates to her Facebook profile. 16 Tatro appealed the University-imposed
sanctions.17 The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately held that a university
may discipline students for statements made on a social networking website
without infringing upon the First Amendment if the speech violates
“narrowly tailored” academic rules which are “directly related” to
professional standards of conduct.18 The Tatro decision exposes Minnesota
students to a wide range of ramifications for otherwise protected, offcampus, First Amendment speech. 19 The precedent set by the Minnesota
10
Mickey Lee Jett, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker in the
Age of Digital Social Media, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 895, 896–97 (2012) (suggesting the
inconsistency in lower court opinions is rooted in the difficulty of applying traditional schoolspeech precedent to “cyberspeech”).
11
N. Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that the
constitutional commitment to wide-open freedom of expression “may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials” but
remains protected).
12
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964) (stating further that since
erroneous and often unpleasant statements are inevitable in free debate, they must be protected
if freedoms of expression are to endure); see also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25–26
(1971) (stating that the word “fuck” should be protected even though it is often less palatable
than other swear words, because words are often chosen as much for their otherwise
inexpressible emotive as their cognitive force).
13
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682–83 (1952)
(affirming that the Constitution was intended to endure the unforeseen transformations of
American society).
14
Id.
15
ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 89 (arguing that internet speech should be as
protected with as much force, if not more, than traditional speech under the First
Amendment).
16
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012) (discussing
Tatro’s involvement in the Mortuary Science Department at the University of Minnesota, as
well as its requirements).
17
Id. at 509.
18
Id. at 511.
19
See id. at 524. The Minnesota Supreme Court states in their decision that Tatro
“is based on the specific circumstances of [the] case—a professional program that operates
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Supreme Court in Tatro contravenes the long-standing principle that student
expression cannot constitutionally be confined to approved sentiments. 20
Students must be able to express themselves freely on their social networking
websites under the First Amendment, just as they would in any other offcampus forum, absent cases of clear threat of harm or danger.21
Part II of this article examines Tatro’s battle to have the University
sanctions reversed, beginning with the University’s formal appeals process
through the Minnesota Supreme Court’s final opinion. 22 Part III discusses
modern social media, the regulation and punishment for otherwise protected
First Amendment speech, and how public universities have used the Internet
to monitor post-secondary students and applicants.23
Part IV argues that off-campus conduct is not interrelated to oncampus conduct, and therefore should not be punished as such.24 Further,
Part IV contends that broad professional standards and often vague
university rules should not be enforced by university regulation of students’
social networking activity that occurs off campus.25 Part IV also asserts that,
without clear direction from the U.S. Supreme Court, students and public
schools are left to wrestle with the difficult, uncertain, and inconsistent
lower-court decisions that are arising in cases like Tatro’s throughout the
country.26 Finally, Part IV argues that absent a clear threat of imminent harm,
the First Amendment should protect a student’s Internet speech from
university regulation.27

under established professional conduct standards . . . and measured discipline that was not
arbitrary or a pretext for punishing the student’s protected views.” Id.
20
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969)
(holding that student speech may not be regulated absent facts showing a material and
substantial interference with the discipline and operation of a school).
21
ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 89 (suggesting that the First Amendment’s
protections should apply with as much, if not more, force in instances of social media for
students and employees).
22
See infra Part II (showing the procedural history of Tatro beginning with the
University of Minnesota’s own appeal process through treatment by the Minnesota Supreme
Court).
23
See infra Part III (discussing the pertinent history of First Amendment student
speech in public grade schools, how courts have applied the resulting case law to the postsecondary setting, and the wide scope of professional standards sought to be taught by postsecondary universities).
24
See infra Part IV.A (asserting that the justifications for limiting First
Amendment protections when speech occurs on campus are not similar enough to off-campus
speech to warrant similar regulation by public schools).
25
See infra Part IV.B (arguing that the potential audience for off-campus speech
is too vast to warrant the same protection and regulation of on-campus speech).
26
See infra Part IV.C (suggesting that public schools are left at a loss, just as their
students are, for applying the shaky rules that result from misdirected opinions such as Tatro).
27
See infra Part IV.D (arguing that the First Amendment should extend to protect
students from regulation of their internet speech).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Amanda Tatro, like many of her classmates, used Facebook to keep
in touch with friends and family while she attended school. 28 The
administration informed Tatro during orientation for her anatomy laboratory
course that discreet conversation regarding the class would be allowed, but
blogging would not.29 Much controversy existed regarding whether Tatro’s
instructor ever explained what she intended the term “blogging” to include;
however, it was commonplace for students to post about the program on their
own Facebook pages.30 What makes Tatro’s experience different than that of
her classmates is the reaction that followed when a student brought the posts
to the attention of the department.31
A. The Posts
In the fall of 2009, Tatro was enrolled in the Bachelor of Science
Mortuary Science Program at the University of Minnesota’s Medical School
offered to upper-class and undergraduate students.32 The program requires
students to successfully complete classes such as science, business, grief
psychology, death and dying across cultures, embalming, and a clinical
rotation in a funeral home.33 The program does not, however, offer or require
a specific ethics course.34 The primary purpose of the program is to prepare
mortuary students to be morticians and funeral directors.35
28

See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing Tatro’s use of Facebook
as her “whole social outlet” while studying at the University of Minnesota).
29
See infra note 41 and accompanying text (stating that Tatro’s instructor felt
defining the term “blogging” was unnecessary because anybody could look it up in the
dictionary).
30
See infra note 41 and accompanying text (stating the professor testified that she
did not provide the definition of “blogging” in any of her course materials).
31
See infra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing that it was common for
other students to make comments regarding lab and course work on Facebook).
32
Respondent’s Brief, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App.
2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131429 at *3 (discussing the requirements of the
University of Minnesota’s Mortuary Science Program).
33
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (No. A10-1440), 2010 WL 7131428 at *2 (explaining the required
courses for completion of the Mortuary Science Program at the University of Minnesota).
34
Id.
35
Id. at *1. Tatro developed an interest in mortuary science after caring for her
mother, who had suffered a severe brain injury, and serving as her mother’s legal guardian. Id.
at *2. Prior to her mother’s injury, Tatro also struggled with her own physical limitations due
to a handicap of her central nervous system. Id. Tatro’s disability caused her to be completely
immobile for many years until medical advances allowed electric spinal cord stimulators to be
implanted and enabled her to move. Id. Tatro felt these experiences familiarized her with
dying and grieving. Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *2. At the same time,
she believed that she needed to joke and express humor, or “[she would] be the most
miserable person on the planet.” Id.
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The Mortuary Department required laboratory courses using human
cadavers from the University’s Anatomy Bequest Program, which relied on
individuals to donate their bodies to the University after death. 36 Tatro
enrolled in three of the required laboratory courses in the fall of 2009 and
received orientation and instructions on the Anatomy Bequest Program
policies and the syllabus rules which governed each laboratory course. 37
Tatro signed the Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy Access
Orientation Disclosure Form, acknowledging that she understood and agreed
to comply with both the program rules, as well as the additional laboratory
polices stated in course syllabi. 38 Course rules allowed respectful and
discreet “[c]onversational language of cadaver dissection outside the
laboratory,” but prohibited “blogging” about the cadaver dissection or
anatomy lab. 39 Tatro’s lab instructor, who drafted the course syllabus,
testified that she intended “blogging” to be a broad term inclusive of
discussion on Facebook and Twitter. 40 However, the University did not
define “blogging” in any of the course criterion or its campus-wide rules and
policies.41 The lab instructor told students that failure to adhere to these rules
may result in their removal from the laboratory and anatomy course.42

36

Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 512 (Minn. 2012). The University’s
medical, dental, physical therapy, occupational therapy, medical device engineering, and
mortuary departments all rely on donations through the bequest program for teaching and
research purposes. Id. More information regarding the University’s professional schools may
be
found
at:
https://webapps
prd.oit.umn.edu/pcas/viewCatalogProgram.do?
programID=194&strm=1129&campus=UMNTC. Each of these respected programs also seeks
to teach respective professional standards. Id.
37
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *4. The first three hour session of Tatro’s
laboratory course was devoted almost entirely to orientation materials including a fourteen
minute Anatomy Bequest Program video which gave examples of disrespectful conversation
outside of the lab such as one where two students were overheard discussing dissection in lab
on a bus by a potential donor. Id.at *4–5.
38
Id. at *7–8. The course syllabus for Tatro’s anatomy lab class included rules
intended to promote respect for the cadaver. Id. at *5.
39
Id.
40
Id. at *6. Tatro later appealed the University sanctions to the University of
Minnesota’s Office for Student Conduct and Academic Integrity (OSCAI) board, which
administers student discipline. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *12–13. The instructor
testified during the OSCAI hearing that she told students blogging included Facebook,
Twitter, and MySpace; however, in response to the question, “So you specifically tell them
that essentially any Internet sites like Facebook is not acceptable to write about the dissection
or the cadaver?” There is no recorded response. Realtor’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33,
at *10. Tatro testified that there was no discussion of what constituted blogging at orientation
and that it was common for students to make general comments about lab classes on
Facebook. Id. Jesse Clarkson, a mortuary student who testified on behalf of the University, did
not recall if the instructor had mentioned anything about Facebook, Twitter, or MySpace in
reference to blogging when he attended orientation. Id.
41
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *10. Tatro’s instructor
testified that it was not necessary to define blogging because it was a term that anyone could
look up in the dictionary. Id. The instructor claimed at the hearing that she relied on the
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Tatro, like many students, used Facebook as a means to keep in
contact with her family and friends while attending school.43 On December
11, 2009, one of Tatro’s classmates notified Mortuary Science Program staff
of a handful of Tatro’s Facebook posts which the student felt were offensive
in relation to a laboratory cadaver.44 The University ultimately claimed that
the following four posts violated University program and rules:
Amanda Beth Tatro Gets to play, I mean dissect,
Bernie today. Let’s see if I can have a lab void of
reprimanding and having my scalpel taken away.
Perhaps if I just hide it in my sleeve . . . (November
12[, 2009])45
Amanda Beth Tatro Is looking forward to
Monday’s embalming therapy as well as a rumored
opportunity to aspirate. Give me room, lots of
aggression to be taken out with a trocar. (December
6[, 2009])46

definition of a blog from Webster dictionary; however, she did not share this definition in any
of her course materials. Id.
42
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *8. There was no mention of any other
disciplinary consequences in the course materials. Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note
33, at *13.
43
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *2 (citation omitted). In fact,
Tatro described Facebook as her “whole social outlet.” Id. Tatro’s Facebook friends included
hundreds of personal friends outside of the Mortuary Science Program, family, and
classmates. Id. During the fall of 2009, Tatro’s Facebook privacy settings allowed friends, as
well as friends of friends to view her Facebook page. Id. Tatro later restricted her privacy
settings so that only friends could view her account. Id. Tatro later claimed she did not believe
that her Facebook posts fell within the scope of the blogging prohibition. Tatro v. Univ. of
Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. 2012).
44
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *8–9 (emphasis added). Tatro stressed
she made the posts off campus. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 524 n.5.
45
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *3. Tatro later explained that
her reference to the donor as “Bernie” came from one of her favorite movies Weekend at
Bernie’s. Id. at *8 (citation omitted). The instructor had allowed past students to name donors
as long as the names were respectful. Id. (citation omitted). Although Tatro did not mention
her reasoning behind the name in any of her Facebook posts, the instructor later testified that
she believed the name was in poor taste do to the plot in the movie where characters bring a
deceased individual with them as if he was still alive. Id. (citation omitted). The director of the
program, Michael LuBrant, testified that there was fear about Tatro hiding a scalpel up her
sleeve. Id. at *6 (citation omitted). LuBrant claimed this post violated the Mortuary
Department’s policy to treat deceased persons with “proper care and dignity.” Id. (citation
omitted).
46
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *3 (emphasis added). A trocar
is an instrument for embalming used to aspirate fluids and gases. Id. at 5 (citation omitted).
The use of a trocar requires force to penetrate the body’s tissue. Id. at 7 (citation omitted).
Tatro later explained that her comment about aggression was made in reference to a prior

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/14

8

Johnson: Tatro v. University of Minnesota

2013]

TATRO V. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

319

[Amanda Beth Tatro] Who knew embalming lab
was so cathartic! I still want to stab a certain
someone in the neck with a trocar though. Hmm . . .
perhaps I will spend the evening updating my
‘Death List #5’ and making friends with the
crematory guy. I do know the code . . . (December
7[, 2009])47
Amanda Beth Tatro Realized with great sadness
that my best friend, Bernie, will no longer be with
me as of Friday next week. I wish to accompany him
to the retort. Now where will I go or who will I hang
with when I need to gather my sanity? Bye, bye
Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket. (Undated)48
According to the director of the Mortuary Science Department
Program, Michael LuBrant, staff members grew concerned for their safety.49
Based on these concerns, LuBrant notified University police about the
posts. 50 LuBrant told Tatro to stay away from the Mortuary Science
Department and its staff while the matter was under investigation. 51
According to the police report, LuBrant told police Tatro was suspended,

incident where a classmate had to use both hands to insert the trocar. Id. (citation omitted). At
that time, other students joked about aggression. Id.
47
Id. at *3. LuBrant testified he believed Tatro’s Facebook entries about stabbing
a certain someone as threats to harm another person. Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra
note 33, at *7 (citation omitted). Tatro did not mention or indicate on Facebook any specific
person she wanted to stab; however, later testified that she was referring to an ex-boyfriend.
Id. at *6 (citation omitted). Tatro was also upset because she had just given permission for her
mother to undergo an operation. Id. (citation omitted). She assumed that her Facebook friends
would know she was not serious, but speaking sarcastically. Id. (citation omitted).
48
Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Within a week of the Facebook post, Tatro had
written “I heart Bernie” on the blackboard in class. Id. at *8 (citation omitted). The instructor
did not tell Tatro at that time that she felt referencing him as Bernie was inappropriate.
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *8. Tatro later testified that “Lock of hair in
my pocket” referenced on of her favorite Black Crow songs. Id. at *9 (citation omitted). Tatro
further explained during the OSCAI hearing that she believed she could be humorous on
Facebook regarding her classes, but knew there were limitations as to the information she
could share with non-classmates which “is precisely why I didn’t go into graphic detail on
what I do in embalming labs or in the anatomy lab.” Id. (citation omitted).
49
Id. at *5. LuBrant testified he was “very much concerned” when he saw the
posts because he “didn't know what they meant or what they were referring to, who they were
talking about.” Id. LuBrant claimed that he later heard the post regarding stabbing someone in
the neck may have been referring to him. Id. LuBrant met with Tatro on December 14, 2009,
but never asked Tatro who or what she was referring to in her posts. Relator’s Brief and
Addendum, supra note 33, at *5.
50
Id. at *12.
51
Id.
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however, later claimed the police report was inaccurate and that no one had
ever told Tatro she was suspended from the program.52
Tatro contacted the media in an attempt to bring attention to what
she believed was a suppression of her First Amendment right to free
speech.53 The Anatomy Bequest Program began to receive letters and phone
calls following the media coverage from donor families who expressed
concern about Tatro’s behavior. 54 University police ultimately determined
that Tatro had not acted criminally, and on December 16, 2009, two days
after she had been told to stay away from the department, staff allowed Tatro
to return to complete her coursework and final examinations. 55 Tatro’s
laboratory instructor notified Tatro via email on December 22, 2009,
that her grade had been entered for “MORT 3171” as a “C+”, but that the
instructor was submitting a formal complaint to the Office of Student
Conduct and Academic Integrity (“OSCAI”) and recommending a grade
change to an “F” as a sanction for the Facebook posts.56
B. Challenging the OSCAI before the University of Minnesota’s Campus
Committee on Student Behavior
Tatro challenged the OSCAI complaint in a formal hearing before
the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (“CCSB”).57 Tatro testified at
the hearing, explaining that she only intended her friends and family who
would understand her sarcasm and morbid humor, as well as her references
to her favorite movies and songs, to read her Facebook posts.58 She further
explained that her post regarding stabbing a “certain someone” was meant to
be seen by her ex-boyfriend, who had broken up with her the night before.59
52

Id.
Id. at 40 n.5.
54
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 32, at *12.
55
Relator’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *12.
56
Id. at *12–13. LuBrant asserted that Tatro did not believe she had done
anything wrong and because she had not expressed remorse for her actions, he and the core
faculty of the Mortuary Science Department felt she should be expelled. Id. at *13 (citation
omitted). None of the faculty members who recommended expulsion asked Tatro what she
intended by any of her Facebook posts. Id. (citation omitted).
57
Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Minn. 2012).
58
Id. at 513. Tatro testified that she gave her cadaver the name “Bernie”
referencing the movie “Weekend at Bernie’s”; that “Death List #5” was a reference to another
one of her favorite movies, “Kill Bill”; and, that the phrase “Lock of hair in my pocket” was a
reference to a song by the Black Crowes, one of her favorite bands. Id. Further, her post from
December 7, 2009, “I still want to stab a certain someone in the throat with a trocar though”
was a reaction to her long distance boyfriend who had recently ended their relationship;
something her friends and family knew she had been upset by. Id. at 514. There is no
evidence, aside from her Facebook posts, that Tatro discussed her anatomy laboratory or
personally identifiable facts regarding the human donor with non-classmates. See id. at 521–
22. Further, there is no evidence to suggest that Tatro physically handled the cadaver in a
disrespectful way as her “lock of hair in my pocket” reference may suggest. See id.
59
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514. According to a study done in February of 2012 by
the Pew Center’s Internet and American Life Project, the average Facebook user has 245
53
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LuBrant, two of the programs’ instructors, and the President of the Mortuary
Science Student Association also testified at the hearing about the program’s
focus on teaching respect, dignity, and professionalism.60 The CCSB found
Tatro responsible for violating the Student Conduct Code, which prohibits
threatening conduct, and violating University rules, which prohibit conduct
that violates departmental regulations. 61 The CCSB’s decision stated that
Tatro’s behavior was inappropriate for an individual within the mortuary
profession. 62 The CCSB required Tatro to seek professional guidance to
facilitate her personal and professional development, and imposed the
following sanctions:
1. Changing Tatro’s grade in MORT 3171 to an
“F”;
2. Completion of a “directed study course” in
clinical ethics;
3. A letter to one of the faculty members in the
Mortuary Science Program addressing the issue
of respect within the program and the
profession;
4. A psychiatric evaluation at the student health
service clinic and completion of any
recommendations made by their evaluation; and
5. Placement on probation for the remainder of
Tatro’s undergraduate career.63

“friends.” Hayley Tsukayama, Your Facebook Friends Have More Friends Than You, WASH.
POST, Feb. 3, 2012. These friends as well as often “friends of friends” may access any post
made by the user. Id. Users can reach an average of 150,000 other people through friends of
friends. Id. Less than five percent of users hide content from other users on their Facebook
feeds. Id. Further explanation, as well as a link to the Pew Center’s statistical findings, can be
found at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/your-facebook-friends-havemore-friends-than-you/2012/02/03/gIQAuNUlmQ_story.html.
60
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 514.
61
Id. Such violations included: “(1) Anatomy Laboratory Rule #7, which
provides in part that ‘[b]logging about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection is not
allowable’; and (2) the rules listed on the Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy Access
Orientation Disclosure Form.” Id. (alteration in original).
62
Id. (indicating that “the reason that these rules are strict is to set standards for
behavior from the beginning of the program that will carry into the profession”).
63
Id. at 514–15.
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Tatro subsequently appealed the CCSB’s decision to the Provost’s
Appeal Committee, comprised of a panel that makes nonbinding
recommendations for the Provost’s review and ultimate decision.64 Provost
E. Thomas Sullivan issued a final decision, which affirmed the findings and
imposed CCSB sanctions.65
C. Appealing to the Minnesota Court of Appeals
Tatro appealed the University’s decision to the Minnesota Court of
Appeals by writ of certiorari.66 Tatro alleged, among other things, that the
sanctions violated her constitutional right to free speech. 67 The court of
appeals determined the University’s sanctions were constitutional if staff
reasonably concluded that Tatro’s posts would “materially and substantially
disrupt the work and discipline of the school under the Tinker standard.”68
The court found that Tatro’s Facebook activity had, in fact, substantially
disrupted the work and discipline of the University, as well as the faith and
confidence potential donors had in the bequest program. 69 Beyond the
University’s concern for the safety and security of its campus, the appeals
court believed that Tatro’s Facebook posts had resulted in substantial issues
regarding the integrity of the University’s Anatomy Bequest Program when
concerned families and funeral directors contacted the University to
complain following the resulting media coverage.70 The court found these
64

Id. at 515.
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 515.
66
See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 800 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); 17
STEPHEN F. BEFORT, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICE § 14:52, at n.21
(3d ed. 2012) (explaining that judicial review of quasi-judicial decisions may be invoked only
by writ of certiorari to the Minnesota Court of Appeals absent a statute or appellate rule
authorizing review to the district court).
67
Realtor’s Brief and Addendum, supra note 33, at *34. Tatro classified her
Facebook posts as literary and satirical expression traditionally covered by the First
Amendment. Id. at *35. Tatro further alleged that “[t]he mere dissemination of ideas–no
matter how offensive to good taste–on a state university campus may not be shut off in the
name alone of ‘conventions of decency.’” Id. at *34 (quoting Papish v. Bd. of Curators of
Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973)).
68
Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 813. In Tinker, two high-school students and one juniorhigh student violated school policy when they wore black armbands to school to protest U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam war. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
504 (1969). When they refused to remove the armbands, the students were suspended. Id. The
Supreme Court subsequently held that the school’s authorities had violated the students’ First
Amendment rights to free speech because the school had no reason to anticipate a “substantial
disruption of or material interference with school activities,” and no such disruption had
occurred. Id. at 514. Tinker represents the beginning of a long line of United States Supreme
Court cases which held that schools may limit or discipline student expression only when
school officials reasonably determine that the otherwise protected First Amendment speech
will materially and substantially disrupt the school’s work and discipline. See, e.g., Tinker,
393 U.S. at 513; Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 820.
69
Tatro, 800 N.W.2d at 822.
70
Id.
65
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disruptions substantial, and upheld the University imposed sanctions citing
Tinker.71
D. The Final Opinion by the Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Tatro’s
case.72 Tatro argued that the Tinker standard, which deals with the regulation
of speech in high schools, provided an improper framework to analyze the
discipline of a post-secondary student. 73 The Minnesota Supreme Court
agreed that Tinker was not the appropriate standard, but affirmed the
sanctions as constitutional, holding that because the academic rules under
which the sanctions were imposed were “narrowly tailored” and “directly
related” to established professional standards, the University did not violate
Tatro’s free speech rights.74
71

Id. at 813, 822–23.
See Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509, 515 (Minn. 2012). Tatro initially
sought review solely on the single issue of “[w]hether a public university violates
constitutional free speech rights by disciplining a student for Facebook posts that contain
satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her school experience but do not identify or
threaten anyone.” Id. However, after the court accepted review of Tatro's petition, Tatro
attempted to further argue in her brief that the University lacked jurisdiction to conduct a
disciplinary hearing, the University presented insufficient evidence to support the rule
violations, and the University lacked authority to change a passing grade to a failing grade. Id.
The Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure require a petitioning party to include a “statement of
the legal issues sought to be reviewed” in the petition for review. MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117,
subd. 3(a). As a result, the court declined to review the non-constitutional issues that Tatro did
not specifically raise in her petition for review. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 515. The Minnesota
Supreme Court allowed for briefing solely on the issue of free speech under the Minnesota
and federal constitutions. Id.
73
Appellant’s Brief and Addendum, Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 N.W.2d 509
(Minn. 2012) (No. A10-1440), 2011 WL 8203726 at *23. Tatro argued, “[t]he court of appeals
. . . committed serious error by relying almost exclusively on case law setting forth the
boundaries of free speech in high schools and junior high schools rather than colleges and
universities.” Id. Tatro further argued that Healy v. James, which stated that “colleges and
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment,” established
that public university students are entitled to the same free speech rights as members of the
general public. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 517–18 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81
(1972) (stating that “[t]he college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
‘marketplace of ideas’”)). Conversely, the University asserted that it may enforce academic
program rules that are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical objectives of training
students to enter the funeral director profession without violating the student’s First
Amendment rights, even when those rules extend to conduct that takes place off campus. Id. at
518 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (stating that
“educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style
and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”)).
74
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 510–11, 524. Because the Minnesota constitutional right
to free speech is coextensive with the First Amendment, the court looked primarily to federal
law for guidance. Id. at 516 (citing State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 798–801 (Minn.
1999) (declining to extend the free speech protections of the Minnesota Constitution “beyond
those protections offered by the First Amendment”)).
72
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The court determined that Tinker was inapplicable because the
driving force behind Tatro’s discipline was not the traditional substantial
disruption to academic activities, but a violation of program rules pertinent to
professional standards. 75 The court instead considered the special
characteristics of the Mortuary Department’s academic environment to
determine whether punishment of Tatro’s otherwise protected First
Amendment speech was constitutional.76 The court’s new standard focused
on the special characteristics of the University’s curricular rules which,
according to the University, were specifically designed to teach professional
conduct standards.77 The court reasoned that confining the newly established
legal standard to solidified professional conduct guidelines would limit a
university’s ability to create overbroad restrictions that would impermissibly
reach a student’s personal and unrelated Facebook activity.78
The court first determined that the University rules were directed to
professional standards. 79 The court applied the professional standards of

75

Id. at 519–20. The United States Supreme Court has explained that, in deciding
the constitutional rights of students, the analysis set forth in Tinker is not absolute, but that
courts must consider the special characteristics of the school environment at issue. Id. at 520
(quoting Morse v. Fredrick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)). In Morse, the Court considered the
special circumstances of an off-campus, school sanctioned, and school supervised event, in
which the student displayed a banner promoting illegal drug use. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393. The
banner read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS. Id. The superintendent of the school explained that the
student was disciplined, not because the school disagreed with his message, but because his
speech appeared to suggest the school advocated the use of illegal drugs. Id. at 398. The
Supreme Court held that the school’s principal did not violate the student’s First Amendment
rights by confiscating the banner. Id. at 410.
76
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520 (stating that in Morse, the Court concluded that
governmental interest in stopping student speech allowed the school to confiscate a banner
promoting illegal drug use from a student off campus during a school sponsored event).
77
Id. at 521. The court’s opinion states:
We acknowledge the concerns expressed by Tatro and
supporting amici that adoption of a broad rule would allow a
public university to regulate a student's personal expression at
any time, at any place, for any claimed curriculum-based reason.
Nonetheless, the parties agree that a university may regulate
student speech on Facebook that violates established
professional conduct standards. This is the legal standard we
adopt here, with the qualification that any restrictions on a
student's Facebook posts must be narrowly tailored and directly
related to established professional conduct standards.
Id. The court states that the factual situation presented in Tatro has not
been addressed in any published court decision and, consequently, the
constitutional standard that applies in the context is unsettled. Id. at 517.
78
Id. at 521. “Accordingly, we hold that a university does not violate the free
speech rights of a student enrolled in a professional program when the university imposes
sanctions for Facebook posts that violate academic program rules that are narrowly tailored
and directly related to established professional conduct standards.” Id.
79
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 520 (stating that ethics are a fundamental part of the
University’s Mortuary program which trains students to be funeral directors and morticians
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morticians and funeral directors in Minnesota, as governed by statute, to
determine if the University’s rules were reasonably related. 80 The court
concluded that the University, as well as course rules, Tatro was found to
have violated were directly related to established professional standards that
require professionals within the mortuary field to treat all individuals
encountered within the scope of the profession with dignity and respect.81
The court also determined that the program rules were narrowly
tailored to the relevant professional standards.82 In examining the scope of
the program rules, the court considered whether the University’s restrictions
on the mode, manner, and place of student speech were “substantially
broader than necessary” to achieve the desired objective. 83 While some
professional standards are written with very precise language, others, which
are less detail-oriented, are in practice very broad.84 Nonetheless, the court
concluded that the University’s sanctions were grounded in narrowly tailored
rules which regulated widely disseminated Facebook posts because the
University was not sanctioning Tatro for a private conversation, but for posts
that could be viewed by thousands, as well as for sharing the Facebook posts

and that the University is entitled to set and enforce reasonable course standards designed to
teach professional norms).
80
Id. at 521–22.
81
Id. at 522–23. “Giving deference to the curriculum decisions of the University,
we conclude that the academic program rules imposed on Tatro as a condition of her access to
human cadavers are directly related to established professional conduct standards.” Id.; see
also MINN. STAT. §149A.70, subd. 7(3) (2007) (defining unprofessional conduct within the
mortuary field as failure to treat any person encountered while within the scope of the
practice, employment, or business with dignity and respect, which the court analyzed in
Tatro).
82
Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523.
83
Id. (relying on Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) which
held that regulation of time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to
serve the government’s interests, but need not be the least restrictive means of doing so).
84
Compare 52 MINN. STAT. ANN., LAWYERS PROF. RESP. BD., OPINION 21 (2009)
(giving precise details regarding a lawyer’s duty to consult with a client about the lawyer’s
own malpractice) with MINN. STAT. § 148B.59 (2007) (allowing revocation of a counselor’s
license if the professional board determines that the counselor engaged in fraudulent,
deceptive, or dishonest conduct, whether or not the conduct relates to the practice of licensed
professional counseling). For example, the University in Tatro stated that their undergraduate
and graduate programs intended to educate students for entry into the many professions that
carry with them obligations of discretion, confidentiality, and professionalism. Tatro, 816
N.W.2d at 520 (noting that the driving force behind the University’s discipline was not a
substantial disruption, as in Tinker, but that Tatro’s Facebook posts violated established
program rules that required respect, discretion, and confidentiality in connection with work on
human cadavers). To prepare students for those professions, the University must train them in
the ethical and professional standards to which they will be held. Id. The court in Tatro,
however, did not specify whether constitutional interference with a student’s otherwise
protected First Amendment speech by a university’s application of “narrowly tailored” and
“directly related” university rules would also apply to broadly professional standards or only
those which are also “narrowly tailored.” Id. at 521–22.
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with the media. 85 Applying the narrowly tailored and directly related
standards, the court determined that the Mortuary Science Program rules
required students to conduct themselves accordingly and that punishment for
violation of such standards did not violate Tatro’s First Amendment rights.86
Tatro’s attorney, Jordan Kushner, stated in an interview with a
Minneapolis newspaper, The Star Tribune, that Tatro wanted to appeal her
case to the United States Supreme Court.87 However, Tatro died just days
after the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its opinion.88 Jordan Kushner has
recently begun another lawsuit which is, at first glance, seemingly similar to
Tatro’s, in what appears to be his ongoing attempt to assert that Facebook is
the student’s and not the public university’s, “business.”89

85

Id. at 523 (holding that the school’s rules prohibiting blogging about cadaver
dissection were not substantially broader than necessary to achieve desired results).
86
Id. at 523. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
In this case, the University is not sanctioning Tatro for a private
conversation, but for Facebook posts that could be viewed by
thousands of Facebook users and for sharing the Facebook posts
with the news media. Accordingly, we conclude that the
University's sanctions were grounded in narrowly tailored rules
regulating widely disseminated Facebook posts.
Id. The court further noted that courts have previously considered the
severity of punishment in student speech cases and, in Tatro’s case, she
was not expelled or even suspended from the Mortuary program, but
instead continued within the Mortuary Science Program with a failing
grade in one laboratory course. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 524.
87
Abby Simmons, U Grad in Facebook Case Dies, STAR TRIB., June 26, 2012.
88
Id. Tatro was thirty-one when she passed away. Id. Kushner described Tatro as
“largely bionic” due to a condition which affected her nervous system. Id. Tatro, prior to her
death, graduated from the University’s Mortuary Science Program. Id. According to Kushner,
she had a difficult time finding work due to her disability. Id. She eventually did find work
with a funeral home; however, complications from her condition prevented her from working
fulltime. Simmons, supra note 87. Tatro’s cause-of-death was not released to the media, and
her family declined to comment. Id. However, Minneapolis police stated that they did not
consider her death to be suspicious. Id.
89
David Hanners, Student Expelled from Brainerd Nursing School for Facebook
Comment Sues, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS, Feb. 17, 2013. On February 8, 2013, Kushner
filed a complaint on Craig Keefe’s behalf. Complaint, Keefe v. Adams, 13-CV-00326-JNELIB, (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2013). Keefe, who was just one semester away from finishing his
degree to become a registered nurse, was expelled for allegedly posting the phrase “stupid
bitch” on his Facebook page, as well as another comment about there not being enough
whiskey for anger management. Id. at 5. Keefe alleges in his complaint:
Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff
Craig Keefe of his rights, privileges and immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, specifically in violation of his First Amendment
Rights to Free Speech, by removing him from an academic
program because of he exercised of his basic and fundamental
right to free expression on his personal time and in a context
that has nothing to do with his obligations as a student.
Id. at 9. The complaint further states:
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III. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court has remained silent on the issue of otherwise
protected, off-campus speech.90 While some courts have allowed both K-12,
as well as post-secondary schools, to regulate and sanction students for
speech occurring on the Internet, others have found this activity
unconstitutional.91 In response to these inconsistent or potentially undesirable
results, state legislatures have taken the matter into their own hands to limit
monitoring of student’s social networking activity.92

[The school administrator] then asked Keefe for an explanation,
while refusing to let him see the documents. Keefe stated that
the comment about whiskey was a joke, that his Facebook
account had been hacked a couple of weeks ago and he had tried
to delete comments which had been posted. [The administrator]
then told Keefe that he was going to be removed from the
nursing program. She held up a stack of papers which was
allegedly Keefe’s entire Facebook page and told him she had
read the whole page and found it disturbing. [She] refused to
allow Keefe to see the documents. [She] also refused to tell
Keefe how she accessed his private Facebook page, but stated
she realized it was a violation of his First Amendment rights.
Id. at 5. Keefe further asserts that the University deprived him of his right
to due process when the expulsion took place without notice or the
opportunity to be heard. Id. at 8.
90
Mary Sue Backus, OMG! Missing the Teachable Moment and Undermining the
Future of the First Amendment – TISNF!, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 153, 165–67 (2009)
(stating that recent Supreme Court cases regarding student speech are limited to on-campus
activity or speech which occurred off school grounds, but during a school-supervised event
and that the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the contours of a student’s free
speech rights when such speech originates off campus).
91
Compare Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 510–11(holding that the University did not
violate Tatro’s free speech rights because the academic program rules under which the
sanctions were imposed were narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional
conduct standards) with J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d
Cir. 2011) (holding that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has ever
allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech that is not school sponsored or at a
school-sponsored event, and because under the Tinker standard the district could not have
reasonably foreseen an on-campus substantial disruption would have occurred, the school
district should not have punished the student for creating a fake MySpace.com profile using
her principle’s picture and accusing him of being a pedophile and sex addict outside of school,
during non-school hours).
92
David L. Hudson Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses Barred from Eyeing
Students’, Workers’ Social Media, 98-NOV A.B.A. J. 22, 22–23 (2012) (stating that
counteracting legislation arose in a number of states in 2012 to prohibit academic institutions
from requiring students or applicants for admission to disclose passwords or account related
information to gain access to the student’s social media profiles).
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A. Modern Social Media
Social networking has revolutionized the way people communicate.93
Individuals can, and do, access Facebook and MySpace wherever they go.94
To some, technology is not a tool, but literally a way of life. 95 Social
networking websites allow an individual to post pictures and information
about themselves at the touch of a button. 96 The reality, however, is that
nothing a person posts on Facebook remains completely confidential.97
MySpace was one of the nation’s earliest widespread social
networking websites.98 MySpace co-founder, Tom Anderson, believed that
MySpace’s success was due, in part, to its appeal to those he termed
“fakesters.”99 So-called fakesters could create a personal profile on MySpace
using any identity they liked by making their page look any way they
wanted. 100 However, because MySpace allowed members the ability to
portray themselves as anyone, it made limiting connections to genuine
friends difficult for users. 101 MySpace also became known for its sexual
influences.102 The website’s policy required users to be at least sixteen, but

93
See Browning, supra note 5, at 842 (discussing the discipline of studentathletes for information shared on social networking websites).
94
ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that at one point, cell phones and
internet were banned in certain places like, for example, courthouses, but now social
institutions have largely accepted the prevalent use of technology and abandoned restrictions
on use).
95
LARRY D. ROSEN, REWIRED: UNDERSTANDING THE ¡GENERATION AND THE WAY
THEY LEARN 27 (2010). The author states that when he asked a friend’s daughter why she
liked technology so much, the daughter replied: “What do you mean why do I like
technology? Isn’t everything technology? I guess I don’t even think about it. It’s sorta like the
sky, ya know. I don’t think about the sky. I just know that when I look up it’s there. Same
with technology. It’s just everywhere.” Id.
96
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 75–76 (noting that social networking sites, like
MySpace, allow a user to have control over what information is posted).
97
Id. at 204 (explaining that the company’s privacy statement reads that any of an
individual’s personal data “may become publically available” after being posted on
Facebook).
98
Id. at 77 (discussing the introduction and evolution of social networking).
99
Id. at 74–75 (suggesting that MySpace was different from its competition
Friendster by allowing members to create their one webpage designs and being less rigid
about who could join than other social networks).
100
Id. (noting that users were able to create profiles using any identity they liked
because co-founders Tom Anderson and Chris DeWolfe put very few restrictions on how
subscribers could use the website).
101
Id. at 75 (suggesting that some people began adding friends regardless of
whether they knew them almost in a competitive way because the more friends you had, the
better).
102
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 75–76 (stating that because MySpace advertised
to nightclubs and bands and had few restrictions for its users, Myspace became known as a
“digital club” where wild behavior was welcome).
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many younger teens and children created profiles.103 In February, 2004, the
same month Facebook was launched to the first group of eligible students at
Harvard University, MySpace was becoming the nation’s dominant social
networking website with more than one million members.104
Conversely, Facebook, originally known as TheFacebook, offered
users limited functionality and personalization when compared to
MySpace.105 One of the most notable differences, at the time of launch, was
that Facebook was only available to students enrolled at elite universities.106
Unlike MySpace, privacy restrictions ensured that Facebook users were
likely connecting to real people who were accurately portraying
themselves. 107 As time progressed, the social networking site became
available to non-students, and by September, 2008, Facebook reached 100
million active users world-wide. 108 As Facebook expanded, the company
relaxed the website’s strict privacy settings, and personal and private user
information is now shared by Facebook with its partner websites and used to
target advertisers.109
With the help of Facebook and MySpace, social networking has
drastically changed the way in which students communicate with one
another. 110 However, as individuals continue to utilize technology making
their private information and thoughts widely accessible, it remains unclear

103

Id. (explaining that it was not unusual for girls as young as thirteen to post
pictures of themselves wearing only undergarments and parents across the country became
increasingly alarmed about the dangers of social media).
104
Id. at 77 (discussing the reputation of MySpace prior to Facebook’s launch in
2004).
105
Id. at 77 (explaining that Facebook, or what was then called TheFacebook, had
a contrasting tone to MySpace because it limited users’ ability to customize their personal
pages).
106
Id. (explaining that Facebook was the first social network created exclusively
for college students).
107
Id. at 83 (expressing that later lawsuits alleged Facebook founder Mark
Zuckurberg stole the idea of a college-centered social networking site which would require
users to register with their “.edu” email addresses to ensure safe connections).
108
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 7, at 303 (discussing the growth of Facebook.com
and the on-going efforts by its CEO Mark Zuckerberg to keep the website relevant and
growing).
109
ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 126 (explaining the erosion of Facebook’s privacy
policy from 2005 through April, 2010). Although we may sign on to our social networking
sites believing them to be a private place, personal information is routinely pulled from our
social networking pages. Id. Andrews argues that social networking companies waited to pull
the rug out from under users by changing their policies on private information only after so
many users were “hooked.” Id.
110
ROSEN, supra note 95, at 27 (stating that preteens and teens are accessing and
using technology at all hours of the day).
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exactly what rules and principles should govern this new social networking
nation.111
B. Striking the Balance: First Amendment Speech in Public K-12 School
Systems
The United States Supreme Court first addressed First Amendment
student speech rights in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District.112 The Court began its opinion by stating, “[i]t can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,” however, “the
Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”113
Therefore, when a student’s exercise of First Amendment speech conflicts
with the rules of their respective public schools, courts are required to
reconcile the two important but competing interests.114
Tinker concerned the potential impact students’ display of black
armbands in protest of the Vietnam War had on both a school’s productivity,
as well as the rights of other students to be secure.115 Faculty and staff had no
indication that the armbands would interfere with the school’s work or the
non-protesting students’ rights and, therefore, the school had no reason to
anticipate a substantial disruption to productivity.116 The school’s desire to
avoid a disagreement in opinion regarding hot button topics among its
students was not enough to allow them to silence student speech on
campus.117 Because the school district was unable to point to any specific
instances of violence or threats of violence as a result of the students’ display
of their black armbands, the Court held the resulting suspensions were
unconstitutional.118
See ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 14 (arguing that the very structure of social
networking websites like Facebook prevent an individual from reinventing themselves, and
that pictures and information posted can be perpetually used against an individual).
112
Benjamin T. Bradford, Is it Really MySpace? Our Disjointed History of Public
School Discipline for Student Speech Needs a New Test for an Online Era, 3 J. MARSHALL L.
J. 323, 326 (2010) (discussing Tinker as the first case in which the Supreme Court was asked
to determine the limits of a public school student's First Amendment right to expression).
113
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506–07 (1969).
114
Id. at 507.
115
Id. at 508.
116
Id. at 509–10. A few students made hostile remarks to the students; however,
no threats or acts of violence took place on the school’s premises. Id. at 508.
117
Id. at 509. “In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
118
Id. at 508. The Court further explained that the Tinker principle is applicable
not only to the supervised speech that takes place in the classroom, but speech throughout the
111
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Since Tinker, the Supreme Court has upheld limited regulation of
student expression in public grade schools. 119 Accordingly, school
administrators have limited discretion in disciplining on-campus student
speech. 120 Supreme Court precedent suggests that at least four types of
student speech may be regulated in public grade schools: on-campus speech
that materially and substantially disrupts school activities; on-campus lewd
or offensive speech; speech that advocates the use of illegal drugs; and
finally, speech which falls into one of the prior three categories and occurs at
school-sponsored events (presumably off campus). 121 Currently, the Court
has declined to hear any major appeal involving student speech that occurs
entirely off campus, including the Internet speech of either a K-12 or postsecondary student.122
Silence by the Supreme Court on the issue of off-campus student
speech has led to the monitoring and punishment of students for
communication on social networking websites by many public K-12 schools

inevitable activities occurring on campus during school hours, such as in the cafeteria or on
athletic fields, to accommodate the students required by law to attend. Id. at 512–13.
119
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–73 (1988) (holding that
two high school principals’ decision to remove two pages from a student newspaper on the
ground that the articles unfairly impinged on privacy rights of pregnant students did not
violate student writers’ First Amendment speech rights); Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 685–86 (1986) (determining that a school district did not violate a student’s First
Amendment rights to free speech when it expelled him for referring to a fellow student in
terms of elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual language during a school assembly).
120
Bradford, supra note 112, at 331 (noting that while schools have been given
more power to censor student speech occurring on campus, it is important to note that the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on student speech occurring off campus, after school hours).
121
Id. (discussing that there are at least four types of student speech which clearly
regulate student speech occurring on campus in public grade schools); see also Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408–10 (2007) (holding that while Tinker warned that schools may
not prohibit student speech because of undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance, a
school district did not offend a student’s constitutional rights following his display of a sign
promoting illegal drug use at a school sponsored event); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271–73
(holding that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may punish
student expression need not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to
lend its name and resources to student expression and that lewd and offensive speech in a
school newspaper could be censored and punished with expulsion without violating a
student’s First Amendment rights); Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. at 688–89 (holding that,
although vulgar speech at an assembly is unlike Tinker in that it does not concern political
viewpoints, the First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining under
the same standard that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would
undermine the school’s basic educational mission).
122
See Bradford, supra note 112, at 331–33 (arguing that Supreme Court
precedent provides “ample rationale as to why schools must be allowed to control student
expression at school, but when the tests outlined in those cases are extended to student speech
occurring at places and times when the students are no longer under school supervision, the
logic behind each of the tests begins to crack, if not completely crumble . . . [h]owever,
because the Court did not outline a method for determining how speech that occurs off
campus can become school speech, lower courts were left to formulate their own tests”).
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across the country.123 Conversely, however, some public K-12 schools have
struggled to hold students accountable for gross violations of curricular
rules.124 In both Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District and Layshock v.
Hermitage School District, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
student who ridicules a school principal online cannot be punished by school
authorities when the speech occurs entirely off campus and does not
substantially disrupt school activities.125
1. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District and Layshock v. Hermitage
School District
In Snyder, a Pennsylvania middle school student was suspended
following her creation, from her home computer, of an Internet profile on
MySpace.com, using her principal’s photograph. 126 The profile did not
identify the principal by name, school, or location; however, it presented a
parody depicting a bisexual Alabama middle school principal named “MHoe.” 127 Statements made on the MySpace.com profile insinuated, among
other things, that the principal was both a sex addict and a pedophile.128
Similarly, in Layshock, a high school student, using his
grandmother’s home computer, created a fake MySpace.com profile for his
principal containing the principal’s first and last name, his photograph from
the school district’s website, and fabricated answers to survey questions
123
Hudson, supra note 92, at 22–23 (arguing that there are multiple incidents
throughout the nation where schools are invading the privacy rights of K-12 students by
observing their social media pages).
124
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933–40 (3d Cir.
2011) (holding that because neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has ever allowed
schools to punish students for off-campus speech that does not occur at a school-sponsored
event, and because under the Tinker standard the district could not have reasonably foreseen
an on-campus substantial disruption would have occurred, the school district should not have
punished the student for creating a fake MySpace.com profile using her principle’s picture and
accusing him of being a pedophile and sex addict outside of school, during non-school hours);
see also Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (deciding, as in
Snyder, that a school district’s limited authority to punish off-campus conduct does not extend
to suspending a student for the creation of an equally vulgar fake MySpace.com account using
a student’s high school principal’s full name and photograph).
125
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931 (stating that the school district could not have
reasonably foreseen that a substantial, on-campus disruption would have occurred); see also
Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (stating “[w]e need not now define the precise parameters of when
the arm of authority can reach beyond the schoolhouse gate because, as we noted earlier, the
district court found that Justin’s conduct did not disrupt the school”).
126
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920.
127
Id.
128
See id. at 921. For example, the “About Me” portion of the profile read as
follows: “HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it's your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, sex
addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] . . . I love children, sex (any
kind), dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick head, and last but not least my darling
wife who looks like a man (who satisfies my needs) . . . .” Id. (alteration in original).
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intended to assist users in creating their account.129 The student answered the
“tell me about yourself” questions to include answers such as: “Birthday: too
drunk to remember”; “Are you a health freak: big steroid freak”; “In the past
month have you smoked: big blunt”; “In the past month have you gone
Skinny Dipping: big lake, not big dick”; etc.130
In an attempt to follow Tinker and subsequent student speech cases,
the Third Circuit held in both cases that because the students’ creation of the
MySpace.com profiles did not cause a substantial disruption within the
schools, the districts violated the students’ First Amendment rights when
they suspended them for making the MySpace pages. 131 The two school
districts filed a joint appeal to the United States Supreme Court following the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decisions.132 The petition argued:
The legal uncertainty is generating tremendous
confusion and wasting resources in thousands of
school districts across the country, where these
issues arise on nearly a daily basis. At the moment,
school officials are stuck between a rock and a hard
place: They are responsible for protecting students
and teachers from online harassment, but in doing
so, they might trigger a lawsuit from a student
claiming that his or her First Amendment rights
have been violated. School officials cannot afford to
wait any longer for a definitive answer.133
On January 17, 2012, the Supreme Court denied the parties’ petition for writ
of certiorari.134 Although both Snyder and Layshock concern student
harassment of a principal, educators and parents have grown increasingly
concerned, as similar incidents directed at classmates have had harmful
effects on youth.135
129

Layshock, 650 F.3d at 207–08.
Id. at 208.
131
Snyder, 650 F.3d at 931 (stating that there was no reasonably foreseeable
disruption the district could have anticipated); see also Layshock, 650 F.3d at 219 (stating that
the student’s conduct did not disrupt the school and that none of the narrow circumstances that
would allow the school to punish for off-campus conduct occurred).
132
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder, No. 11502 (Oct. 18, 2011), 2011 WL 5014761 at *1.
133
Id. at *2–3.
134
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Blue Mountain Sch. Dist. v. Snyder, 132 S. Ct.
1097 (Jan. 17, 2012) (No. 11-502). The United States Supreme Court did not provide any
explanation for the denial. Id.
135
NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS: RESPONDING TO
THE CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL AGGRESSION, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 1 (2007) (discussing
strategies for school administrators, counselors, psychologists, school resource officers,
teachers, and others in dealing with cyberbullying and cyberthreats among youth). Children
and youth who are targets of bullying can become tense, anxious, and afraid. Id. at 47.
130
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2. Cyberbullying in K-12 Public Schools
Nancy Willard, executive director of the Center for Safe and
Responsible Internet Use, defines cyberbullying as the sending or posting of
harmful or aggressive material using the Internet or other digital
technology. 136 She further defines cyberthreats to include the sending or
posting of direct threats that suggest the student may be considering
committing an act of violence against him or herself, or another person.137 As
young students become increasingly connected to the Internet and digital
technology, educators are faced with challenging issues when off-campus
cyberbullying and cyberthreats, which may be considered protected speech,
affect students on campus.138 Educators are left with uncertain standards to
determine when they can intervene in cases of off-campus cyberbullying.139
Cyberbullying is a relatively new phenomenon. 140 As a result, its
effects have not been widely studied and results of limited studies are largely
inconsistent.141 The prevalence of cyberbullying and cyberthreats is largely
unknown due, in part, to the fact that children and teens rarely report the
abuse.142 Unlike traditional on-campus bullying, cyberbullying can occur at
any time of the day or night, making it often inescapable for victims. 143
Cyberbullies are also often able to remain completely anonymous, saying

Bullying can have long-term consequences, even years after the bullying has stopped. Id. at
48. Adults who were bullied as children have higher levels of depression and poorer selfesteem than other their age. Id. It is possible that the effects of cyberbullying can be more
emotionally damaging than traditional bullying for a number of reasons including that targets
of in-school bullying have the ability to escape when at home, while cyberbullying can occur
at all hours of the day. Id.
136
Id. at 1. Willard provides a number of examples illustrative of how
cyberbullying may occur including the following example: “Mary, an obese high school
student, was changing in the locker room after gym class. Jessica took a covert picture of her
with her cell phone camera. Within seconds, the picture was flying around the cell phones at
school.” WILLARD, supra note 135, at 1.
137
Id. at 2. However, different researchers have labeled specific acts including
cyberbullying and cyberthreats differently. Id. at 32.
138
Id. at 2.
139
Id. at 101.
140
Renee L. Servance, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the Conflict
Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2003) (suggesting
that although the use of the Internet to bully is a relatively new phenomenon, the only real
difference between cyberbullying and traditional bullying is that it takes place on the Internet).
141
WILLARD, supra note 135, at 32 (stating that it is probable that inconsistencies
in the limited studies that have taken place on cyberbullying may be due, in part, to the
differences in labeling for specific acts).
142
Id. at 49 (suggesting that many teens think the adults they would otherwise go
to for help will not understand the Internet and their online world or know how to respond to
the bullying and be unable to help).
143
Id. at 48 (suggesting that a cyberbully can target their victim any time they use
a technological device, or even when they are not using the device by creating a defaming
website that remains visible to others on the Internet at all times).
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things they might not otherwise say in person as a result.144 Furthermore,
unlike traditional bullying, Internet-created harassment can make the
communication widely available and accessible by countless others when
comments are sent using email or by posting on a public forum such as
MySpace or Facebook. 145 Finally, hurtful comments may remain on the
Internet indefinitely, and victims are unable to escape the harassment. 146
Because teens spend an increased amount of time using the Internet to
communicate, online harassment has become prevalent.147
Like school administrators who risk violating a student’s First
Amendment rights by taking action against a cyberbully, educators who do
not respond to student threats may also risk liability.148 As of 2009, twenty
states had adopted laws to combat cyberbullying in K-12 public schools.149
These state laws, however, only cover incidents of cyberbullying within the
limited authority of public schools over on-campus student speech and,
therefore, leave cyberbullying that occurs off campus and during after-school
hours unpunishable. 150 Additionally, parents and victimized students may
bring tort or criminal actions for such harassment in absence of
cyberbullying laws. 151 Finally, when harmful speech is significantly
damaging to a student’s emotional well-being and interferes with a student’s

144
Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 850 (2010)
(discussing the evolution of bullying from the playground to the Internet and suggesting that
the ease of remaining anonymous on the Internet can make it hard for victims to initially
respond to their bullies).
145
Id. (stating that, even worse, some websites are specifically dedicated to online
criticism and exist solely for cyberbullies to post photos and insulting captions).
146
Id. at 850–51 (arguing that the relative ease with which bullies can harass
online creates disproportionate effects for the target who may be unable to escape the presence
of a comment that they cannot remove from the Internet).
147
WILLARD, supra note 135, at 32 (arguing that despite the difficulty in
determining precise incident rates of cyberbullying and cyberthreats, such harassment has
become as great a concern as traditional bullying, if not greater).
148
Servance, supra note 140, at 1215. Schools have been held liable for failing to
respond to instances of peer-to-peer harassment. Id. Following the Columbine shootings,
parents of survivors and families of students who were killed sued the Jefferson County
school district in Colorado for failing to protect their children from peer-to-peer danger. Id. at
1215 n.11. See, e.g., Peter G. Chronis, Victims' Cases Seen as Rocky Ground for Lawyers,
DENVER POST, May 21, 1999, at A7.
149
King, supra note 144, at 858; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 121A.0695 (2007)
(stating “[e]ach school board shall adopt a written policy prohibiting intimidation and bullying
of any student. The policy shall address intimidation and bullying in all forms, including, but
not limited to, electronic forms and forms involving Internet use”).
150
King, supra note 144, at 860 (arguing that these laws apply only to peer-to-peer
harassment and that non-students cannot be punished by a school district they do not attend).
151
Id. at 852 (suggesting that this is not a sufficient remedy for victims of
cyberbullying because tort and criminal laws are not specifically designed to counteract
Internet harassment).
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ability to learn, courts may be inclined to support district intervention under
the material and substantial disruption language set forth in Tinker.152
School officials are not helpless, however, even when questioned
speech does not fall under enacted state cyberbullying statutes, tort law, or
criminal law. 153 Informal intervention, without punishment, to address
incidents of cyberbullying may provide an effective solution for a K-12
administration seeking to avoid liability for the suppression of First
Amendment rights.154 Educators can do this by informally involving parents,
school counselors, teachers, and school staff.155
C. The Monitoring of College Applicants’ and Student-Athletes’ Social
Media Accounts by Public Universities
As social networking websites have grown, access to the information
they contain has become increasingly simple for post-secondary educational
institutions and programs. 156 Some state legislatures have responded by
forbidding post-secondary and K-12 schools from monitoring students’
social networking activity.157
A survey in 2008 revealed that one in every ten college admissions
officers used social networking websites to view applicant activity as a part
of their decision-making process. 158 Of the admissions officers viewing
applicant web pages, thirty-eight percent said that viewing the pages had a
negative impact on the students’ admissions evaluations.159 Likewise, many
public colleges and universities across the country are mandating that
student-athletes install software applications on their computers and wireless
152

WILLARD, supra note 135, at 114–15 (suggesting that determining whether the
threat will likely result in a material and substantial disruption requires an assessment of the
overall situation as well as the degree of harmfulness of the speech). Tinker references a
public K-12 school’s ability to protect the rights of other students to be let alone and free from
harm who are required by law to attend during school hours and therefore cannot avoid
exposure to the offensive speech. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969).
153
WILLARD, supra note 135, at 115–16 (stating that there are ways to intervene
informally to address incidents of cyberbullying occurring off campus when educators become
concerned for the impact it is having on students or otherwise on campus).
154
Id. at 115.
155
Id.
156
ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 126 (arguing that personal information about social
network users is routinely viewed without users knowing it as a result of Facebook’s eroding
privacy policy).
157
Browning, supra note 5, at 843 (discussing the response of state legislatures to
post-secondary monitoring of student speech on social networking websites).
158
ANDREWS, supra note 1, at 122 (discussing how seemingly innocuous postings
have been used to make judgments about people by schools, employers, mortgage brokers,
credit card companies, and many other social institutions).
159
Id. One admissions officer stated that a potential applicant had been rejected
when the officer viewed the student’s posts bragging that he felt he had aced the application
process for the school, but that he did not feel he wanted to attend. Id.
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devices which monitor their activity and search for key words suggestive of
discussion regarding use of alcohol or illegal drugs, obscenities or offensive
comments, or references to NCAA violations including the offering of bribes
or solicitation of agents.160
In an attempt to protect students, legislatures in Maryland, Delaware,
and California have passed legislation forbidding both K-12, as well as postsecondary educational institutions and programs, from requiring students to
provide login information, passwords, or installing monitoring software.161
Courts have also responded to protect First Amendment interests on social
media where legislatures have not.162 In one unpublished decision, R.S. v.
Minnewaska Area School District No. 2149, a Minnesota Federal District
Court held that school officials violated a student’s First and Fourth
Amendment rights by forcing her to turn over her Facebook and private
email passwords.163
Although universities have considerable reputational and tangible
interests at stake when admitting students to participate in their educational,
as well as athletic, programs, constitutional protections do not cease to exist
for these students.164 With recent legislation prohibiting the monitoring of
student speech on social networking websites, it is logical to assume that
similar future statutes may arise to protect the First Amendment rights of
student-applicants, enrolled students, and student-athletes.165

Browning, supra note 5, at 841–42 (arguing that university monitoring of
potentially objectionable social-networking activity by student athletes requires such students
to relinquish their right to privacy and protections under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution).
161
Id. at 843. These laws have largely been inspired by those prohibiting
employers from forcing employees or job applicants from turning over passwords for social
media accounts. Id.
162
Id. “[W]hile several courts have justified certain invasions of a studentathlete’s Fourth Amendment rights in cases involving random drug testing, recent decisions in
the digital age have come down on the side of protecting a students [sic] right to expression
via social media.” Id.
163
R.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. Dist. No. 2149, Civ. No. 12-588 (MJD/LIB),
2012 WL 3870868, at *1 (D. Minn. Sept. 6, 2012) (holding that if the facts alleged in the
complaint are true, the Minnesota middle-school student’s constitutional rights were violated
by requiring she provide her Facebook password); Browning, supra note 5, at 843 n.9.
160

Browning, supra note 5, at 841 (arguing that it becomes tricky for postsecondary schools and athlete programs for constitutional purposes when the content of a
student-athlete’s social media page is not materially or substantially disruptive, but may be
classified as First Amendment speech).
165
Id. at 843 (stating that as of December, 2012, ten other states were considering
legislation similar to California, Illinois, and Maryland’s laws prohibiting schools from
requiring students to turn over social media passwords).
164
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IV. ANALYSIS
School administrators and students alike need guidance to determine
what, if any, off-campus Internet speech may be regulated by public
universities and K-12 school systems. 166 Tatro establishes new and
dangerous precedent for Minnesota students by suggesting that public
universities may punish for any violation of a course or campus-wide rule if
the administration can establish a connection between the violation and a
correlating professional standard.167 The rule the University claimed Tatro
violated was not only overly broad; it was undefinable even by faculty.168
Additionally, the professional standards the court believed the Mortuary
Department rules sought to teach and enforce were vague, subjective, and
nearly all-inclusive. 169 Some courts have held the opposite of Tatro,
however, and have reasoned that K-12 students cannot be punished for
speech taking place off campus unless a resulting material disruption occurs
on campus. 170 The First Amendment is deeply rooted within a strong
commitment to the fundamental principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited.171 No less should be said for a student’s participation in a
public debate on a social networking website.172 Social networking students

166
See supra text accompanying note 133 (arguing that the legal uncertainty of
how schools may treat off-campus Internet speech is generating tremendous confusion and
wasting resources in thousands of school districts across the country).
167
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing how the Tatro court did
not specify how broad or narrow the professional rules a University can impose and punish
under can be).
168
See supra note 40 and accompanying text (noting that Tatro’s instructor did not
respond when asked if she had informed her students what constituted “blogging” during
orientation, but that she intended it to be an all-encompassing term).
169
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of
unprofessional conduct of morticians under MINN. STAT. § 149A.70, subd. 7(3), which
includes any failure to treat any person within the scope of practice, employment, or business
with dignity and respect as a statutory violation).
170
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (holding in J.S. ex rel. Snyder v.
Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011) that because neither the Supreme
Court nor the Third Circuit has ever allowed schools to punish students for off-campus speech
that is not school-sponsored or at a school-sponsored event, and because under the Tinker
standard the district could not have reasonably foreseen an on-campus substantial disruption
would have occurred, the school district should not have punished the student for creating a
fake MySpace.com profile using her principle’s picture and accusing him of being a pedophile
and sex addict outside of school, during non-school hours).
171
See supra note 11 and accompanying text (stating that the constitutional
commitment to freedom of expression remains wide-open and protected despite the fact that it
may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials).
172
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (suggesting that social networkers
deserve the same free speech rights as those offline and there is a necessity to create a social
networking constitution).
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must have the ability to connect and speak freely on the Internet except in
cases of clear threat of harm or danger.173
A. Punishment for Off-Campus Speech is not Interrelated to On-Campus
Speech and Should not Be Punished as Such
Supreme Court student speech cases, which have dealt exclusively
with incidents occurring either on campus or during school-sponsored
events, are ill-suited to decide off-campus internet speech cases.174 Landmark
decisions such as Tinker and Morse have afforded educators authority to
control student speech during school hours, but the logic behind those cases
does not extend to off-campus student speech. 175 Recent lower court
decisions are illustrative of this fact. 176 Lower courts have been left to
formulate their own tests for determining when off-campus speech becomes
a legitimate educational concern that may be regulated.177 As evidenced by
decisions like Tatro, Layshock, and Snyder, resulting decisions have been
largely inconsistent.178 Off-campus Internet speech is unlike the on-campus
speech that educators in K-12 schools may regulate under Supreme Court
precedent. 179 Supreme Court student speech cases beginning with Tinker
seek to protect students who are required by law to attend class and therefore
cannot avoid an on-campus disruption caused by another classmate without
allowing educational intervention of the otherwise protected

173
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating further that since erroneous
and often unpleasant statements are inevitable in free debate, they must be protected if
freedoms of expression are to endure).
174
See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court
has never directly addressed the issue of educational control over or punishment for otherwise
protected First Amendment student speech).
175
See supra note 122 and accompanying text (arguing that the logic behind
Supreme Court student speech opinions cracks, if not completely crumbles, when applied to
off-campus student speech).
176
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (holding that a school district’s
limited authority to punish off-campus conduct does not extend to suspending a student for the
off-campus use of a social networking website).
177
See supra note 122 and accompanying text (stating that because the Court has
not outlined a method for determining when off-campus speech can become school speech,
lower courts have been left to create their own tests).
178
See supra text accompanying note 10 (stating that without any guidance from
the United States Supreme Court, lower court decisions concerning Internet speech have been
inconsistent); see also supra text accompanying note 91 (explaining that while some courts
have allowed schools to regulate and sanction students for speech occurring on the Internet,
others have found such regulation to be an unconstitutional violation of students’ First
Amendment rights).
179
See supra text accompanying note 121 (stating that Supreme Court precedent
suggests K-12 schools may be able to regulate speech in at least four instances: when it occurs
on campus and materially disrupts the activities of the school; when the speech occurs on
campus and is lewd or offensive; when the speech advocates illegal drug use; or when speech
falls into one of the first three categories and occurs at a school-sponsored event).
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demonstration. 180 K-12 students are not, however, also legally required to
sign on to the Internet and view what may have been posted by their
classmates when they return home after school hours. 181 Therefore, while
Tinker seeks to protect students from what they cannot otherwise avoid, the
same concern does not exist for speech that occurs off campus and online.182
As a result, cases concerning off-campus speech cannot fully rely upon the
precedent of Supreme Court opinions regarding on-campus student
speech.183
1. Authority Afforded by the Supreme Court for Educators Concerning
On-Campus Students is Limited
In Tinker, the Supreme Court held that a K-12 public school district
violated students’ First Amendment rights by suspending them for displaying
black armbands during school hours in protest of the Vietnam War.184 The
Court held that because the school had no reason to anticipate a substantial
and material disruption of school activities, and because no actual substantial
disruption had occurred, the school could not limit or discipline the students
for their First Amendment, anti-war expression.185 Under Tinker, speech that
does or is substantially likely to cause a material and substantial disruption
on campus may be regulated by a public K-12 school. 186 This type of
regulation is allowed to protect the rights of other students who are required

180
See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text (referencing Tinker’s holding
that a public K-12 school must be able to protect the rights of other students to be let alone
and free from harm when they are required by law to attend during school hours and therefore
cannot avoid exposure to the offensive speech).
181
See supra text accompanying notes 93–111 (discussing the evolution of social
networking and companies’ such as MySpace and Facebook’s constant attempts to seek new
members who can choose to access, join, or abstain from using the websites).
182
See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text (holding that educators must
be able to protect their students who are required by law to attend classes and cannot
otherwise avoid offensive First Amendment demonstrations).
183
See supra note 122 and accompanying text (arguing that Supreme Court
student speech precedent cannot be properly applied to off-campus student speech).
184
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing that when the students
refused, upon request, to remove their armbands, the administration subsequently suspended
the students).
185
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (stating that Tinker represents the
beginning of a long line of United States Supreme Court precedent requiring the anticipation
or occurrence of a material and substantial disruption on campus to justify suppression of
otherwise protected First Amendment student speech).
186
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that the Tinker principle
is applicable not only to the supervised speech that takes place in the classroom, but speech
throughout the inevitable activities occurring on campus during school hours such as in the
cafeteria or on athletic fields).
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by law to attend and therefore cannot otherwise avoid exposure to the
offensive and disruptive speech.187
In Morse, the Supreme Court considered the special circumstances
of off-campus student speech occurring during a school-sanctioned and
school-supervised event.188 During the event, a student displayed a banner
promoting illegal drug use. 189 The superintendent later explained that the
student was disciplined for refusing to take down the banner not because the
school disagreed with the message the student wished to convey, but because
the banner’s presence appeared to suggest the school supported the use of
illegal drugs.190 The Court held that, due to the special characteristics of the
school environment at issue in Morse, the school had not violated the
student’s First Amendment rights by confiscating his banner.191
2. The Concerns Surrounding On-Campus Speech Are not Present in OffCampus Student Speech Cases
Amanda Tatro’s Facebook posts do not present the same concerns
protected by the Supreme Court in Tinker or Morse. 192 Nonetheless, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals relied almost exclusively on Tinker, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court relied almost exclusively on Morse, in reaching
their opinions. 193 Unlike what is required under the Tinker standard for
suppression of otherwise protected student expression, Tatro’s posts did not

187

See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that educators must be
able to regulate student speech that causes a substantial and material disruption on campus to
accommodate the students required by law to attend).
188
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding under Morse that the court
may consider the special circumstances of off-campus, school sanctioned, and supervised
events).
189
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that the banner read “BONG
HiTS 4 JESUS).
190
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that due to the fact that the
event was school-sponsored and supervised, the speech appeared to suggest the school also
advocated the use of illegal drugs).
191
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding that the Tinker standard
requiring a material and substantial disruption on campus is not absolute, and the court may
consider the school environment at issue).
192
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (stating that a banner soliciting
illegal drug use could constitutionally be confiscated from a student because its presence
otherwise appeared to suggest the school advocated the illegal activity); see also supra note
68 and accompanying text (stating that Tinker represents the first of many Supreme Court
cases requiring a material and substantial disruption on campus in order to justify suppression
of student speech).
193
See supra text accompanying note 69 (explaining that the Minnesota Court of
Appeals applied Tinker’s substantial and material disruption to Tatro’s case); see also supra
note 75 and accompanying text (stating that the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Morse
and held that the substantial and material disruption standard is not absolute and that the court
must consider the special characteristics of the school environment at issue).
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result in a material and substantial disruption with school activities. 194 In
fact, before the Facebook posts were brought to the Mortuary Department’s
attention, Tatro had written “I heart Bernie” on the blackboard in her
laboratory classroom in reference to the cadaver.195 The same instructor who
found Tatro’s nickname for the donor offensive did not, at that time, tell
Tatro she felt her actions were inappropriate or a violation of school rules.196
Class continued, undisrupted, as usual despite the fact that the speech was
nearly the same as that at issue in Tatro’s Facebook posts.197 Unlike public
K-12 students protected under Tinker, Tatro’s classmates were not required
by law to attend during school hours and therefore unable to avoid exposure
to her speech.198 Unlike a K-12 student, any one of Tatro’s classmates could
have left to avoid her offensive comments if they had occurred during class
or on campus.199 Therefore, Tatro’s classmates did not require the protection
of the University if they felt Tatro’s comments were unpleasant.200
Likewise, Tatro’s Facebook posts do not fit squarely within the
precedent set forth by Morse.201 Unlike the student in Morse who displayed a
banner during a school-supervised and sponsored event, the presence of the
Facebook posts on Tatro’s personal page did not suggest the University
would be seen as an advocate or supporter of her opinions.202 A student who
posts on a blog or webpage speaks not to the limited audience of a
classroom, but an immeasurable group of social networkers. 203 More
194
See supra note 20 and accompanying text (holding that a material and
substantial interference with school activities is required for a school to discipline a student
for otherwise protected speech).
195
See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that Tatro had written “I
heart Bernie” on the blackboard of her laboratory classroom).
196
See supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that Tatro was never told
by the instructor that her reference was inappropriate and no material disruption occurred as a
result of Tatro’s on-campus conduct).
197
See supra text accompanying notes 44–50 (demonstrating that it was not until
December 11, 2009, when one of Tatro’s classmates brought her Facebook activity to the
attention of a professor, that the Mortuary Department became concerned and notified campus
police).
198
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that the Tinker principle
is applicable to the inevitable activities occurring on campus during school hours required by
law).
199
See supra note 118 and accompanying text (holding that Tinker applies not
only to speech that occurs in the classroom, but during school hours while K-12 students are
performing other activities).
200
See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that Tatro stressed she made
the posts off campus).
201
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding in Morse that an
educational institution does not violate a student’s First Amendment rights by confiscating a
banner when its presence suggests school-sponsored support).
202
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing that a banner promoting
illegal drug use alludes to support by the school when present at a school-supervised and
school-sponsored activity).
203
See supra text accompanying note 108 (discussing that in September, 2008,
Facebook reached 100 million active users and strives to keep growing); see also supra note
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importantly, a student who expresses an unpopular opinion on a social
networking webpage does not do so as a member of an educational
institution, but as one of millions participating in the ongoing exchange of
information online.204 Allowing a post-secondary university to regulate what
its students say, removed from the classroom or any school-sponsored event,
means that every Internet post containing any form of speech, written or
otherwise, may be scrutinized against the educational goals of the
university. 205 As demonstrated by inconsistent lower court opinions,
Supreme Court precedent does not support punishment for the wide-range of
potential behavior that occurs online.206
Unlike the Tatro court, the Third Circuit found in Layshock and
Snyder that a school district’s limited authority under the First Amendment
to restrict student speech should not be extended to off-campus speech
without Supreme Court guidance. 207 The Third Circuit reached this result
interpreting the same cases that the Tatro court considered. 208 The
inconsistencies in lower court decisions have inevitably led to confusion for
both students as well as public educational institutions.209 Furthermore, the
decisions demonstrate that on-campus speech is unlike off-campus speech
and the two cannot be treated synonymously.210 The Court has left public
schools puzzled as they attempt to determine for themselves when they may

59 and accompanying text (stating that according to a study done in 2012, the average
Facebook user has 245 “friends” and that users reach an average of 150,000 other people
through friends of friends when they publish a post).
204
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining that the average
Facebook user has about 245 friends who they select to share personal information with on
Facebook).
205
See supra note 78 and accompanying text (holding that a university may punish
a student for what it believes to be a violation of university rules that are narrowly tailored and
directly related to professional standards).
206
See supra text accompanying notes 132–134 (discussing the confusion that
exists for educators attempting to apply on-campus precedent to off-campus Internet speech
cases).
207
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (holding that the creation of a
vulgar fake MySpace profile using a principal’s full name does not justify a public school’s
punishment of a student).
208
See supra notes 124–125, 131 and accompanying text (reasoning that because
the Supreme Court has never allowed a school to punish student conduct occurring off campus
unless during a school-sponsored event as in Morse, and because no substantial disruption
occurred on campus under the Tinker standard, the Third Circuit would not attempt to extend
those cases to the off-campus conduct that occurred in Layshock and Snyder).
209
See supra note 10 and accompanying text (arguing that inconsistent lower court
opinions are largely a result of difficulty in applying student-speech precedent to off-campus
cases).
210
See supra text accompanying note 133 (explaining that such inconsistences
have resulted in wasted resources and fear of being sued in response to punishment of a
student for their off-campus Internet conduct).
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reach beyond the schoolhouse gate to regulate and discipline for speech
occurring off campus.211
B. Professional Standards and University Rules are Not Meant to be
Enforced by a University Acting as a Facebook “Friend”
No matter how fair and impartial a particular educational forum may
seem, giving educators and staff the green light to regulate off-campus
Internet speech, so long as it relates to a course or university rule and
corresponding professional standard, will unavoidably result in ill-motivated
or illegitimate means of student punishment.212 The United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that shocking or overtly distasteful speech
remains protected under the First Amendment.213 While a student would
hope that the majority of educators and administrative staff would be
trustworthy, the First Amendment seeks to protect against the select few who
will undoubtedly abuse their authority.214
1. Legislative Movement to Prevent Monitoring by Public Universities of
College Students’ Demonstrates Legislative Interest to Protect the First
Amendment
Although universities have significant interests at stake in the
admission of students to their educational, as well as athletic programs,
students have an equally, if not more, important interest in maintaining their
constitutional freedom of expression.215 If years later, public universities are
able to review past social networking activity prior to admitting a new
applicant, legal yet offensive First Amendment activity may prevent an

211

See supra text accompanying note 133 (describing the tremendous confusion
and wasted resources in thousands of school districts across the country attempting to address
issues arising from off-campus speech).
212
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that student interests are
often at odds with faculty interests, and that often these differences in value, view, and
ideology ask for change directly in the tradition of the First Amendment).
213
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (holding that the word “fuck” is
protected because of its cognitive force and that erroneous and unpleasant statements must be
protected if freedoms of expression are expected to endure); see also supra note 117 and
accompanying text (holding that for the State to justify prohibition of a particular expression,
it must be able to identify something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that accompany an unpopular viewpoint).
214
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (stating the United States Supreme
Court has held that school authorities violated students’ First Amendment right to free speech
when it suspended them for making a political statement on campus).
215
See supra text accompanying note 164 (explaining that universities have both
tangible as well as reputational interests at stake when they admit a student into their
university or athletic program, as well as when they offer that student a financial benefit to
attend).
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individual from obtaining a college degree or financial scholarship.216 Posts
published by future students could remain online for decades to come
making it nearly impossible for children to reinvent themselves as adults.217
State legislatures in Maryland, Delaware, and California have passed
legislation prohibiting universities from requiring students to waive their
First Amendment rights and provide their public schools with passwords,
login information, or install monitoring software. 218 This movement
demonstrates a legitimate legislative interest in protecting the constitutional
rights of both K-12, as well as post-secondary, students by preventing
universities from using Facebook and MySpace as a tool to monitor current
and future students.219 As many as ten other states have considered adopting
similar legislation.220
College applicants’ personal information is viewed routinely by the
admission departments of many public colleges.221 Admissions departments
have, as a result of what they view on a student’s Facebook or MySpace
account, chosen not to admit otherwise qualified students. 222 Similarly,
colleges with athletic programs have gone as far as requiring student athletes
to waive their First Amendment rights and install spy software on to their
personal computers.223 Such software can monitor the student’s activity on
social networking websites and search for key-words that they have used
which may suggest the student is discussing illegal drug use, alcohol use, or
using obscene or offensive language. 224 Additionally, the software’s key-

216
See supra note 103 and accompanying text (suggesting that parents became
alarmed concerning the potential repercussions of their children’s actions).
217
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that Facebook provides
that users’ public information may become publically available after being posted).
218
See supra notes 161–162 and accompanying text (explaining that such laws
were largely inspired by similar legislation preventing employers from requiring the same
information from their employees).
219
See supra text accompanying notes 161–162 (explaining that there has been a
response by state legislatures to protect students from the monitoring of their private activity
on social networking websites by their public schools and universities).
220
See supra note 161 and accompanying text (suggesting that as of December,
2012, these were the only three states to enact the student aimed legislation); see also supra
note 165 and accompanying text (stating that as of December, 2012, ten other states were
considering legislation similar to the laws discussed above of Maryland, Delaware, and
California).
221
See supra text accompanying notes 158–160 (discussing a 2008 survey which
revealed that one in ten public universities accessed applicant’s social networking information
in determining whether to admit them to their school).
222
See supra note 159 and accompanying text (suggesting that one admissions
officer reported a specific instance where a student was rejected for bragging on his Facebook
page that he had aced the application process but did not feel as though he would be attending
that particular university).
223
See supra text accompanying note 160 (suggesting that some public colleges
are making such software mandatory for student athletes).
224
See supra text accompanying note 160 (explaining the functionality of the
monitoring software being used by some public colleges).
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word search can scan for discussion referencing NCAA and potential
violations under the NCAA rules.225
Technology is not necessarily a tool for today’s children, but
inevitably a significant part of their daily lives. 226 Children as young as
thirteen have been known to post inappropriate content on their social
networking pages.227 Social networking activity can remain for long periods
of time making it difficult for adults to leave their past decisions behind. 228
State legislatures have demonstrated that there is a need to protect a child or
student’s private decisions from their future universities.229
2. Tatro Allows for Broad Punishment of Expansive Rules Indirectly
Related to Professional Standards
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s holding in Tatro suggests that
public universities may punish for a broad range of student behavior if a
rational connection can be made between the otherwise protected speech and
a professional standard. 230 In Tatro, the court held that Tatro could
constitutionally be punished for university rules that were “narrowly
tailored” and “directly related” to the professional standards taught by the
mortuary program.231 Despite the University’s insistence that the Mortuary
Program sought to emphasize and teach professional standards as a vital part
of its curriculum, the mortuary department did not offer any ethics courses to
its mortuary students. 232 Furthermore, it is clear that what constituted
“blogging” about the laboratory course was likely never explained to Tatro
225

See supra text accompanying note 160 (explaining that the key-word search
can scan for references to NCAA violations including, for example, the offering of bribes or
solicitation by agents).
226
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (quoting a young girl who stated
“Isn’t everything technology? . . . I don’t think about [it] . . . [i]t’s just everywhere”).
227
See supra note 103 and accompanying text (explaining that it was not unusual
for girls as young as thirteen to post inappropriate pictures of themselves on MySpace).
228
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining that Facebook provides
that users’ public information may become publically available after being posted).
229
See supra note 103 and accompanying text (suggesting that parents became
alarmed concerning the potential repercussions of their children’s actions).
230
See supra text accompanying note 18 (holding that a post-secondary university
may punish a student without infringing upon their First Amendment right to free speech if
such punishment is the result a violation of a university rule that is narrowly tailored and
directly related to professional conduct standards); see also supra note 81 and accompanying
text (explaining that the Tatro standard gives great deference to a university in determining
when a connection exists between a professional standard and student conduct that is
offensive or inconsistent with such professional standards).
231
See supra text accompanying note 18 (using the language “narrowly tailored”
and “directly related” to establish what the court considered the sufficient nexus to allow
educational punishment of otherwise protected, off-campus speech).
232
See supra text accompanying notes 33–34 (explaining that while the
University of Minnesota’s Mortuary Program requires classes such as science, business, grief
and dying across cultures, embalming, and a clinical rotation to a funeral home, it did not offer
a specific ethics course when Tatro was a student).
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and her classmates. 233 Tatro was unaware not only that her expressive
conduct violated the subjectively written laboratory course rule, but likely,
that a connection could be made to a professional standard regarding dignity
and respect of a body.234
The professional rule the University claimed Tatro’s Facebook posts
violated states in relevant part that no licensee or intern shall engage in
unprofessional conduct, “including but not limited to . . . failure to treat with
dignity and respect the body of the deceased . . . or any other person
encountered while within the scope of practice, employment, or business.”235
Allowing regulation of this professional standard by a university means that
a student can be punished for failing to treat any person with dignity and
respect under any university standard or rule.236 Furthermore, the statutory
language “including but not limited to” suggests that the scope of the rule
may extend beyond the explicit language of the statute and include
unmentioned behavior.237
The Tatro holding leaves unquestionably broad discretion for the
regulation of professional standards through application of university rules,
not only for mortuary students, but the numerous professional programs that
are offered to Minnesota post-secondary students. 238 For example, the
Minnesota statute regulating professional conduct for family counselors
states that a counselor’s license may be revoked if the professional board
determines he or she engaged in “dishonest conduct,” whether or not the
conduct relates to their employment.239 Under Tatro, students studying to be
licensed therapists can be punished for violating any university or course rule
which relates to dishonest conduct even if that conduct does not relate to

233

See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (stating that Tatro testified there
was no discussion of what constituted blogging; Tatro’s classmate who testified on behalf of
the University did not recall if the instructor had ever mentioned anything about Facebook,
Twitter, or MySpace in reference to blogging, and the professor felt defining something
students could look up in the dictionary unnecessary).
234
See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text (explaining not only Tatro
testified there was no discussion of what constituted blogging at orientation, but that when
asked if she had specifically told students it was not acceptable to write on Facebook
regarding the course, Tatro’s professor was unable to respond on the record).
235
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (stating that Minn. Stat. § 149A.70,
subd. 7(3) (2007), which the Minnesota Supreme Court found the university rule against
“blogging” to correlate to, regulates the professional conduct of funeral directors).
236
See supra note 79 and accompanying text (suggesting that the University is
entitled to enforce professional norms through the creation and regulation of university and
course rules).
237
See supra note 79 and accompanying text (stating that ethics are a fundamental
part of an educational program and therefore can be regulated by public educators and staff).
238
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (stating that the University of
Minnesota offers many programs at both the graduate, as well as undergraduate level, which
concern professional standards).
239
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing MINN. STAT. § 148B.59
(2007) regulating the professional conduct of a counselor).
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their status as a student or future employee.240 Where the Tatro court would
draw the line, however, and disallow university suppression of student
speech is unclear.241
C. Without Clear Direction from the U.S. Supreme Court, Public
Schooling at all Levels is Stuck between a Rock and a Hard Place in
Applying Tatro-like Standards
The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to draw a definable line in
Tatro and, as a result, Minnesota students and public schools remain
vulnerable.242 Courts have struggled to balance First Amendment, oncampus, student speech with the educational goals of public universities
since Tinker.243 Attempting to implement on-campus precedent to offcampus Internet speech has led to confusing and inconsistent decisions.244
Guidance from the United States Supreme Court is essential to the resolution
of future Tatro like cases.245
1. The Vital Protection of Student Expression under the First Amendment
Sanctioning students for violating broad curricular rules which may
or may not correlate to expansive professional standards, poses the danger of
overshadowing otherwise protected speech in the interest of maintaining
potentially outdated professional norms.246 American students are notorious
for challenging professional norms under the broad protection of the First
Amendment. 247 Society depends on the encouragement of fresh, young
240
See supra note 79 and accompanying text (stating that a University may
enforce professional norms through application of campus rules).
241
See supra text accompanying note 78 (suggesting that the Tatro court did not
specify how the breadth of professional standards affects a university’s ability to punish for
student expression).
242
See supra note 89 and accompanying text (stating that a student who was just
one semester away from graduating from nursing school was kicked out of a Minnesota public
university’s program for calling someone a “stupid bitch” on his Facebook page).
243
See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the United States
Supreme Court’s holding in Tinker where courts first limited a public school’s ability to
regulate on-campus student speech).
244
See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that tremendous confusion
exists in thousands of school districts regarding off-campus speech leading to wasted
resources).
245
See supra note 120 and accompanying text (stating that while schools have
been given power through student speech cases to regulate on campus, the Supreme Court has
not addressed regulation of off-campus speech).
246
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (regarding a state-supported college’s
denial of Petitioner’s application requesting recognition of a controversial political student
organization).
247
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (stating that student interests and
concerns are often quite different from those of the faculty, result from values, views, and
ideologies that are at war with the ones which the college has traditionally espoused or
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perspectives to continue forward movement on an innovative path toward
global growth. 248 It is clear that Tatro’s Facebook posts were not only
offensive, but unlikely to propel academia forward.249 However, the Tatro
decision extends far beyond Tatro’s unpleasant posts.250 Under Tatro, any
unpopular thought or political speech considered reasonably related to a
professional standard may now, should a public university choose, be
regulated and punished regardless of when, where, or how it occurs.251 The
United States Supreme Court must exercise its power to determine what
Internet student speech may be suppressed in the interest of an educational
program and what must continue to be protected under the First Amendment
in the interest of post-secondary student privacy, as well as academic
growth.252
2. Protecting Youth against Cyberbullying and Cyberthreats does not
Require Suppression of the First Amendment
Concern for cyberbullying and cyberthreats has left many concerned
students, parents, and educators fearful that public schools lack the power to
address attacks on K-12 children without suppressing the bully’s free speech
rights.253 In an attempt to regulate cyberbullying, schools are left with the
same inconsistent precedent to determine what role they can play in
regulating off-campus Internet speech.254
Students, who use the Internet to harass classmates, threaten
violence, or to make false statements of criminal activity, should reasonably

indoctrinated, when such students ask for change, the students speak in the tradition of
Jefferson and Madison and the First Amendment); see also supra note 12 and accompanying
text (stating that often unpleasant statements are inevitable in free debate and must be
protected).
248
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (explaining that when students ask for
change, it is typically at odds with the ideologies of the university).
249
See supra text accompanying notes 44–48 (quoting Tatro’s Facebook posts
deemed offensive and inappropriate under professional conduct standards by the University of
Minnesota).
250
See supra text accompanying note 18 (holding that a public university may
punish a student for any conduct that violates a narrowly tailored university rule that the
university can show is related to a professional standard).
251
See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that Tatro stressed she made
the posts off campus).
252
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (holding that scholarship cannot
flourish in the absence of First Amendment protections).
253
See supra text accompanying note 138 (stating that educators are faced with
challenging issues when off-campus cyberbullying that is potentially protected from school
interference under the First Amendment has a clear effect on their students).
254
See supra text accompanying note 133 (arguing that school districts are faced
with confusing standards regarding off-campus speech).
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be punished for their actions.255 Internet harassment may have an extreme
impact on victims.256 Students, parents, and educators may address issues of
cyberbullying and cyberthreats under state law, as well as through informal
methods without infringing upon a student’s First Amendment rights, such as
school counseling or by contacting parents.257
Conflicting lower court opinions suggest that a school must prepare
for the possibility of lengthy and expensive litigation in response to any
punishment of a student for Internet conduct.258 The Supreme Court must
determine when student speech occurring off campus and on the Internet
may be regulated by K-12 schools to protect both victims of cyberbullying as
well as the constitutional rights of students. 259 Until the Supreme Court
accepts an Internet student speech case, violent threats may continue, in
some instances, to go unpunished while activist students remain at risk for
punishment as a result of their unpopular opinions.260 As is evidenced by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, some educators are expected to maintain a
total hands-off approach to the regulation of off-campus Internet speech
absent a direct threat of violence.261 Regardless of which court has it right,
wrong, or otherwise, it is clear that the holdings are, at best, unpredictable
and resolution of the issue is fundamental to future student speech cases.262

255

See supra text accompanying notes 153–155 (suggesting that intervention by
school officials without student punishment may sometimes allow for effective action while
avoiding liability for suppression of First Amendment rights).
256
See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the long-term,
damaging effects that bullying can have on children immediately, as well as later as adults).
257
See supra text accompanying notes 150–155 (explaining that victims of
cyberbullying, parents, and concerned teachers may rely on state bullying laws, criminal law,
or tort law, as well as attempt to address the situation informally without suppressing student
speech under the First Amendment to counteract cyberbullying).
258
See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that confusing standards have
led to the concern that schools might trigger a lawsuit claiming violation of First Amendment
rights for regulating off-campus student speech that occurs online).
259
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (suggesting that unpopular and often
unpleasant thought must be protected under the First Amendment); see also supra text
accompanying note 133 (suggesting that school officials cannot afford to wait any longer for a
definitive answer as to when they may intervene to protect students who are being targeted by
internet bullies).
260
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that erroneous and
unpleasant statements must be protected under the First Amendment); see also supra note 89
and accompanying text (discussing the expulsion of a student for posting the phrase “stupid
bitch” on Facebook and stating that there was not enough whiskey in the world for anger
management).
261
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (holding that because neither the
Third Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court has ever allowed an educational institution
to punish for off-campus speech, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will not do so now).
262
See supra note 91 and accompanying text (comparing the holding of Tatro to
Snyder and its application of the Tinker standard).
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Technology plays an intricate and vital role in the way individuals
communicate. 263 Internet accessibility and its capability of connecting
individuals with literally anyone in the world presents problems far removed
from the traditional on-campus student speech that the Supreme Court has
analyzed.264 The Supreme Court must draw a clear line for lower courts to
apply to student speech cases like Tatro. 265 Without such direction,
inconsistencies will remain, innocent students will be sanctioned for
exercising their constitutional rights, and violence may at times go
unpunished by concerned educators.266
D. Absent Clear Harm or Imminent Threat, the First Amendment Should
Extend to all Social Network Speech
The First Amendment should extend to all student speech on social
networking websites except in cases of clear threat of harm or imminent
danger.267 The Supreme Court has never punished student speech that occurs
entirely off campus and is unrelated to a school sponsored activity.268 To
allow public K-12 school districts and public post-secondary universities to
regulate and punish for expressive student speech would create the
opportunity for egregious punishment by educators.269

263

See supra text accompanying note

5

(stating that social networking has

revolutionized the way in which people communicate); see also supra note 1 and
accompanying text (holding that the First Amendment permits a state to ban “true threats,” to
protect individuals from the fear of violence and disruption).
264
See supra note 122 and accompanying text (arguing that the logic behind
Supreme Court student speech opinions crumbles when applied to off-campus student
speech).
265
See supra text accompanying note 133 (explaining schools are stuck between a
rock and a hard place without direction from the Supreme Court on the First Amendment
rights of students off campus and online, and their public K-12 schools to punish students for
it when necessary).
266
See supra text accompanying note 133 (stating that K-12 public schools are
responsible for protecting students and teachers from online harassment).
267
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (arguing that a Social Networking
Constitution should be created to protect freedom of expression online under the First
Amendment).
268
See supra note 90 and accompanying text (asserting that Supreme Court
student speech cases are limited to on-campus activity or speech which occurred during a
school-supervised event and that the Supreme Court has yet to address the contours of a
student’s free speech rights when such speech originates off campus).
269
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (suggesting that any leeway for
punishment of employees and students could lead to unconstitutional results).
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1. Punishment for Off-Campus Speech Offends a Students’ First
Amendment Rights
Democracy is grounded in the ability of citizens to speak freely and
critically.270 To say otherwise, offends the protections provided by the First
Amendment.271 The Supreme Court has stated that the vigilant protection of
First Amendment protection is nowhere more vital than in American
schools. 272 Student interests are traditionally at odds with those of their
educational institutions.273 Yet the Court has stated, time and time again, that
unpopular or offensive student demonstration is, and must continue to be,
constitutionally protected.274
While K-12 students, who are required by law to attend class,
occasionally need protection from substantial disruptions occurring on
campus, students do not require the same protection for the conduct of their
classmates that occurs off campus. 275 In expressing potentially unpopular
opinions, students contribute a fresh perspective within the academic
community, call for change to outdated standards, and work to advance
society. 276 To ensure the growth of academia, teachers and students alike
must remain free to inquire and evaluate under First Amendment
protections.277

270
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that unpleasant statements
must be protected in free debate).
271
See supra note 12 and accompanying text (suggesting that such unpleasantries
must be tolerated if constitutional protections are expected to endure).
272
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (holding that teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study, and to evaluate).
273
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (suggesting that often student values
are at war with those traditionally espoused or indoctrinated by the college).
274
See supra notes 2–4, 20, 73 (holding that a K-12 school system’s ability to
regulate speech is highly limited); see also supra text accompanying note 121 (suggesting that
at least four exceptions exist which allow regulation of student speech: (1) on-campus speech
that substantially or materially disrupts school activities; (2) lewd or offensive speech
occurring on campus; (3) speech that advocates the use of illegal drugs; or (4) speech that falls
into one of the first three categories and occurs off campus, but during a school sponsored
event).
275
See supra notes 118, 152 and accompanying text (holding that educators must
be able to act to protect the interests of their students who are required by law to attend
classes).
276
See supra note 4 and accompanying text (arguing that when students ask for
change, they speak directly to the spirit of Jefferson, Madison, and the First Amendment).
277
See supra note 3 and accompanying text (asserting that scholarship cannot
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust).
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2. Schools Can Still Protect Students against Cyberbullies if Social
Networking Speech is Protected under the First Amendment
Extending First Amendment protection to student speech occurring
on the Internet would not, however, wholly prevent a public K-12 school
district from addressing cyberbullying or cyberthreats. 278 Educators may
informally involve parents, school counselors, teachers, and school staff to
address potential cyberbullies. 279 Victims of online harassment and their
parents may also seek remedies for questioned speech that falls under
enacted state tort or criminal law.280 Most importantly, as with any speech
that may otherwise fall under the First Amendment, threats of violence or
imminent harm are not constitutionally protected and will always justify K12 or post-secondary intervention.281 These alternative remedies suggest that
confining the First Amendment in student speech cases will not effectively
resolve the on-going issues with cyberbullies and cyberthreats.282
Tatro, however, never made true threats of violence or intent to
cause imminent harm in her Facebook posts. 283 Tatro explained that her
December 6, 2009 post stating, “[g]ive me room, lots of aggression to be
taken out with a trocar” referenced a previous incident where a classmate had
to use both hands to insert a trocar.284 Tatro also explained that her December
7, 2009 post which read “[w]ho knew embalming lab was so cathartic! I still
want to stab a certain someone in the neck with a trocar though” was
regarding an ex-boyfriend whom she had recently broken up with.285 Tatro
assumed that her Facebook friends would know she was speaking

278

See supra text accompanying notes 154–155 (noting that there are less formal
ways to address cyberbullying and cyberspeech than to punish a student by expelling or
suspending them).
279
See supra text accompanying notes 154–155 (suggesting that such informal
intervention may take place when faculty and staff become concerned that the off-campus
speech may be affecting a student on campus).
280
See supra text accompanying note 151 (stating that students experiencing
harassment online may be protected by state law).
281
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (holding that the First Amendment
permits a State to ban “true threats” regardless of actual intent to carry out the threat, to
protect individuals from the fear of violence and disruption).
282
See supra text accompanying notes 151–155 (discussing the many alternatives
that exist for victims of cyberbullying as well as those acting in the cyberbully or victim’s
interest to prevent future harassment).
283
See supra text accompanying notes 45–48 (quoting Tatro’s Facebook posts
November 12, 2009, December 6, 2009, December 7, 2009, and one undated that became the
subject of her punishment and later litigation).
284
See supra note 46 and accompanying text (indicating that at that time, other
students in Tatro’s laboratory class had joked about aggression).
285
See supra note 47 and accompanying text (suggesting that Tatro was upset due
to her breakup as well as the fact that she had recently given permission for her mother to
undergo surgery).
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sarcastically and in reaction to the breakup.286 University police reviewed the
posts and determined that Tatro’s posts did not amount to criminal threats.287
Although the content of her posts was clearly distasteful, the status updates
did not suggest that Tatro was planning or intending to commit any unlawful
or violent act from which individuals must be protected. 288 The Supreme
Court has never upheld punishment of a student for expressive activity
occurring off campus with the exception of school-sponsored events for K12 students. 289 The Minnesota Supreme Court’s extension of on-campus
precedent to off-campus control of post-secondary students is unfounded in
student-speech cases.290
Post-secondary students, like Tatro, who use Facebook to express
their private thoughts, should not be required to take a leave of absence from
their First Amendment rights until they have graduated from their respective
universities.291 The Constitution was written to stand the test of time and,
absent a true threat, the First Amendment therefore extends to student speech
on the Internet.292
V. CONCLUSION
In this country, we do not allow children to drive cars without
supervision until they are at least sixteen years of age.293 Similarly, we do not
consider an individual to be a legal adult until they are eighteen years old.294
It is not until they reach the age of twenty-one, three years after they have
reached legal adulthood that they are able to enter a bar and purchase an
286

See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that Tatro assumed her
Facebook friends would know that she was not seriously considering using the laboratory tool
as a weapon).
287
See supra text accompanying note 55 (stating that University Police ultimately
determined that Tatro had not acted criminally).
288
See supra text accompanying note 55 (explaining that University police
determined Tatro had not acted criminally when she posted regarding the Mortuary Science
Program on Facebook).
289
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (holding in Morse that a school
district does not violate a student’s First Amendment rights by confiscating a banner
promoting illegal drug use at a school-sponsored event when the presence of the banner
suggests the school’s support of illegal activity).
290
See supra text accompanying note 121 (discussing the four categories of
United States Supreme Court cases which have allowed a school to suppress student speech).
291
See supra note 15 and accompanying text (arguing that speech occurring online
should be as, if not more, protected than First Amendment speech occurring offline).
292
See supra note 1 and accompanying text (arguing that a Social Networking
Constitution should be created to protect freedom of expression online under the First
Amendment).
293
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting that allowing a child to
use social networking websites may be just as dangerous as handing them the keys to a car).
294
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (arguing that while the U.S.
Constitution generally protects freedom of expression, the issue becomes particularly tricky
when dealing with underage students).
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alcoholic beverage. 295 Our society imposes these age restrictions, among
other reasons, to protect the child or young adult from decisions they have
not become mature enough to make.296 Children of all ages, however, use
technology without supervision or similar legal protection. 297 In fact, we
encourage children to acquire computer skills knowing their significance in
our modern world.298 Tatro suggests that a student waives his or her First
Amendment right to free speech and subsequently opens him or herself up to
punishment when his or her Internet post contravenes a legitimate
educational rule related to a professional standard.299 If this is true, we must
come to accept that, under cases like Tatro, a child may waive deeply rooted
constitutional rights before he or she is even old enough to open a checking
account.300

295
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that individuals are not legally
allowed to drink until they have reached the age of 21).
296
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (arguing that we do this to protect
children who are not ready to face the potential consequences of such dangerous activities).
297
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (quoting an underage student
explaining that technology is everywhere and a part of her daily life).
298
See supra text accompanying note 8 (explaining that society encourages the
use of technology by students of a young age due to its prevalence in society).
299
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (holding that Tatro could be
punished for a Facebook post which could have been viewed by thousands on Facebook).
300
See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting that we encourage use of
technology by young people yet, restrict their ability to drink, drive and engage in otherwise
dangerous activities to protect them).
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